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SUMMARY:

.

~

This case has been straight-lined

with No. 78-599, Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, and
No. 78-1005, Brown v. Allen.

It raises a question

substantially identical to that in the other two cases:
Whether Air Force regulations that require military
personnel to obtain approval before circulating petitions
on base are consistent with 10 U.S.C.
\
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Amendment.

I recommend reading the cert memos in the

following order:

--------------

(1) Huff, (2) Glines, and (3) Allen.

Thus, this memo should be read second.
2.

FACTS:

Air Force regulations provide that

"the public solicitation or collection oi signatures on
a petition by any person within an Air Force facility or
by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign country
is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander."
Distribution of such material is prohibited if the commander determines that "a, clear danger to the l oyalty,
discipline, or morale of members o

ed Forces, or

material interference with the accomplishment of a military
mission, would result."
In 1974, while resp was on active duty as a captain
in the Air Force Reserves, he drafted petitions to the
Secretary of Defense and to several members of Congress
opposing military hair length standards.

The petition

~

somehow came to the notice of his superiors at Travis Air
Force Base in California, and they informed him that on-base
circulation was permitted only with approval of the base
commander.

Resp circulated the petition off-base.

That same

year resp was assigned, to Anderson Air Force Base in Guam.
There he gave the petitions to a sergeant who circulated them
~
\

the base.

Because permission had not been sought, resp

was disciplined by being removed from active duty status.

- 3 Resp then filed this action, seeking reinstatement

and back pay, alleging that the regulations violated the
First Amendment and 10 U.S.C. § 1034:
"No person may restrict any member
of an armed force in communicating
with a member of Congress, unless
the communication is unlawful or
violates a regulation necessary to
the security of the United States."
The district court on cross-motions for summary judgment
struck down the regulations on their face as applied to
non-combat zones.

The court, relying exclusively on the

First Amendment, found that the regulations suffered from
overbreadth and imposed a considerable burden on the First
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances.

Only

in extraordinary circumstances, such as a combat zone or
perhaps in an induction center, does the military have a
demonstrable need for prior restraint.

The court enjoined

the Air Force from enforcing the regulations against resp,
and ordered his reinstatement as well as $22,000 in back pay.

Cgj_ _

The CA 9 affirmed in part and vacated and remanded
in part.

Relying on its earlier decision in

Ailen (No. 78-1005) and the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Huff
(No. 78-599), the court held that§ 1034 prohibits the application of the prior approval requirement to the distribution
of petitions to members of Congress at the Guam Air Base.

Al-

though it was unsure of the precise nature of the Guam base,
it did not think that allowing the petitions would be any more

- 4 -

disruptive to security than allowing the petitions at the
combat-ready base in Huff.
Because one of the petitions was addressed to
the Secretary of Defense, the CA 9 was forced to reach the

question of whether the prior approval requirement is constitutional.

It . found that it was not.

Classing the re-

quirement as a prior restraint, the court concluded that the
regulations were overbroad and that there was insufficient
justification for them.

Punishment after the fact for

genuinely disruptive petitions is enough to protect the

interests of the military.
Despite holding the regulations unconstitutional,
the CA 9 observed that monetary claims against the Government
in excess of $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Claim.so

It therefore vacated the award of back

pay and remanded to the district court for dismissal of that
claim without prejudice or transfer to the Court of Claims. ~

I

3.

CONTENTIONS:

The SG asks that this case be held

pending disposition of Huff.

The response basically reiterates

the reasoning of the CA 9 in this case and in Allen.

Punish-

ment after the fact and the time, place, and manner restrictions
approved in Allen are sufficient to protect the Government's
interest.

The protected interest is important, and the decisions

below were clearly correct.
over the issue.

Finally, there is no circuit conflict

- 5 4.

DISCUSSION:

Although there is no conflict

there is also a substantial possibility, as the memo writer
in Huff noted, that this issue may not be litigated much in

the future.

Thus, the fact that there is no circuit conflict

is not as important as it sounds.
If the Court is inclined to review the issue, it
seems to me (contrary to the SG's conclusion) that this would
be the case to take.

In this case the First Amendment issue

is more squarely presented because one of the petitions was
addressed to the Secretary of Defense and not to Congress.
. Thus, the judgment in this case extends to all petitions
circulated on the base, no matter to whom they are addressed.
There is a response.

'
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl
No. 78-1006
Harold R. Brown, Secretary
. .
Defense, et al., Pet1t10ners,

of! 0 n W nt. of c·ert10ran
. . to t h e
U . dS
C
fA
mte . tates ourt o p· peals for the Ninth Circuit.
·
·
..

v.

Albert Edward Glines,

j

.,'

[January - , 1980]
MR. J USTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves challenges to United States Air Force
regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on
Air .Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations
violate the First Amendment. The second question is
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions
to M embers of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to
communicate with a Member of Congress.

·,
1•.

1I
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force personnel have the right to petition Meinbers of Congress and other
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) . The regulation s, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force
facility '' and "any •(Air Force] member . . . in uniform or . ..
in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition
without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate
commander. Ibid.1 They also provide that "[n]o member
Air Force Reg. 30- 1 (9) (1971) provides :
"Righi of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and
civ iliah employees have the right, in common with all other citizens, to
1

i

•:,

'
.

,•f.,.
, .,,,

.,
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written
material ... within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander. . . ." Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)
(a) (1) (1970). The comman<ler can deny permission only
if he determines that distribution of the material would result in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with
the accomplishment of a military mission . . . !' Id., 3515 (3) (a) (2). 2
petition the Prcsidrnt, the Congress or other public official,::. However,
the ~olicitation or collection of signature,; on a petition within an Air
Forcl' facility or by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign
countrr is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander."
2 Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1970) provides:
"( l) No member of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed
or written material other than publications of an official government
agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation withont permission of the commander or hi;; designee. A copy of the material with a proposed 1>lan or method of distribution or posting will be
8ubmitted when permi:,;:,;ion is requested. Distribution of publications and
other materials through the United States mail or through official outlet::;,
such as military libraries and exchanges, may not be prohibited under this
regulation.
"(2) When prior approval for distribution or posting h; required, the
commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, di,:cipline, or
morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with
the accomplishment of a military mii,sion, would re,,mlt. If such a determination is made, distribution or po:,;ting will be prohibited and HQ
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances.
" (3) Mere po:;,gei,sion of makrials unauthorized for distribution or posting may not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes
or posts or attempts to distribute or post such material within the instalbt1on. Impounded materials will be returned to the owner when departing the in~tallation unles, determined to be evidence of a crime.
'' (4) Distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the ground
that (he material is critical of Government policies or officials.
" ( 5) ln general, installation commanders should encourage and promote
the availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media
which present a wide range of viewpoiuti-; on public issues."

78-1006-OPINION
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves.
While on 8/ctive duty at the Travis Air Force Base in California, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air
Force's grooming standards. 3 Aware that he needed command approval in order to solicit signatures within a base,
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. During a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before military authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines'
commander promptly removed him from active duty, determined that he had failed to meet the professional standards
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby reserves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the
, circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and
1
10 U. S. C. § 1034. 1 The court granted Glines' motion for
summary judgment and declared the regulations facially invalid. 401 F . Supp. 127 (1975). 0
s The petition to the Secretary of Defense, for example, read:
"Dear Secretary of Defense:
"We, the undersigned, all American citizens serving in the Armed Serv.
ices of our nation, n•queot your assistance in changing the grooming standards of the United States Air Force.
"We feel that the present rt•gulations on grooming have caused more
racial tension, decr('ase in morale and retention, and loss of respect for
authority than any other official Air Force poliC'y.
"'\Ve are similarly prtitioning Senator Cranston, Senator Tunney, Senator
Jackson, and Congre~sma,n Moss in the hope that one of our elected or
appointed official:; will help correct this problem." Glines v. Wade, 586 F.
2d 675,677, n. 1 (CA9 1978) .
4 Glines named as defendants three of his superior officers, the Secretary
1
' of the Air Force, and the Secretary of Dcfen8e.
5 The District Court also awarded Cline,; backpa.y and ordered him
restored to active service. 401 F . Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).G Following its decision in an earlier case involving collective petitions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034. 7 ·· The statute
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's communication with Congress "unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of
the United States." The Air Force regulations against
unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the statutory standard, the court concluded, because the Government
had not shown that such restraints 011 servicemen in Guam
were necessary to the national. security. Id., at 679. Since
1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of Defense, the court next considered whether the regulations violated the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that
requirements of military discip1ine could justify otherwise
impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that
the Air Force regulations are ui1eonstitutionally overbroad
because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually

s

Court of Ap])ea!s aff.rrned the reinstatement order, but it vacated the
backpay awr,rd on the ground that all monetary claims aga.inst the United
States for more than $10,000 are witbin the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims. 586 F. 2d, at 681-682. Neit11er is~ue is before this

Court.
6
The Court of Appeab held that Glines was not requirrd to exhaust
his administrative remedies by seeking relief from t1ie Air Force Board
for the Corrrc1ion of Military Records . The court found that Glines' claim
involved stat utory and ronstitutional matters over which the Board had
no jurisdiction. Id., at 678. Smee the peiitioners expre:;sly declined to
raise the rxha11stion issue in this Court, Pet. for Cert. 6, n. 2, error in the
Court of AppPals ' m;oh1tion of the issue would not affect 011r jurisdiction .
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,330 (1976) .
7
The Court of Appeals' decision and the di:;cussion of this issue appea1•
in its opinion in Allen v. Monger, 583 F. 2d 438, 440-442 (CA9 1978).
(:ert. pending sub norn. Brown v. Allen, No. 78--1005,

78-1006-0PINION
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all controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such restrictions, the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari,
- U.S. (1978), and we now reverse.

II
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JUSTICE
wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitution ... disables a military commander from acting to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command."
In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political literature on a military base challenged an Army regulation
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that
the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of material that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness
of his troops. See id., at 837- 839. We therefore sustailled
the Army regulation. Id., at 840. For the same reasons, we
now uphold the Air Force regulations.
These regulations, like the Anny regulation in Spock , pro.
tect a substantial government interest umelated to the suppression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U. S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, "by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker
v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 ( 1974). Military personnel must
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises.
Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing
their mission promptly and reliably, the military services
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life. " Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U. . 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Poree v.
Rose, 425 U. S. 352, 367- 368 (1976) .
8'rEWART

·.
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"'Spcecll tJ1at is protected iu the civil populatio11 may
underrnillc the eff Pctiveness of response to command.'"
Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest,
21 U. S. C'. M. A. 564. 570. 45 C'. M. R. 338. 344 (1972).
Thus, whik members of the military services are entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment. "tlw different character of th0 military com1uu11ity and the military mission requires a clifferellt application of those protections." Parker
v. Levy, supra, at 758. The rights of military men must yield
somewhat "'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty . . . . ' " Id., at 744. quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346
U. S. 1:11, 140 (H)53) (plurality opinio11). 8 Speech likely to
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock,
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BrRGEH, C. J., concurring); id.,
at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest. , ee Procimier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Army
and the Air Force rPgulations implement the policy set forth
in Department, of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (196~)). 9
That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's
"right to expression . . . to the maximum extent possible,
consistent with good order and discipline and the national security." J,d., ,r II. Thus, the regulations in both services
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air ~..,orce Reg. 35-15 (3)
8 See Emer,-;on, Toward n, General Thc'ory of the Fir,-;t Amendment, 72
Yale L . .f. 877, 935-936 (1936); Tnrell, Petitioning ActivitieH on :VIilitary
Base~: Tlw Fin,t Amendment Batlle Rages Again, 28 Emory L . J. 3, 5-14
(1979) .
9
Tlw Nav? regulation:, adopted pursuant to Deparlmen1 of Defcn~e
(DOD) Directive 1325.fl (19fl9) are at issue in Secretary of the Navy v,
Huff, No . 78-599, wlncl1 we also decide toqay,

18-1006-OPINION
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(a)(2); Army Reg. 210-10, ,r 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir.
1325.6, iT III (A)( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifically prevent commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air
Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 ,TIU (A)
(3). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post exchange newstands. Air .Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a)(l); see
DOD Dir. 1325.6, ,r III (A) (l). 10 Nor may they interfere
with the " [ d] istribution of publications and other materials
through the United States mail. ..." Air Force Reg. 35-15
(3) (a) (1). The Air Force regulations also require any commander who preveuts the circulation of materials within his
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Force Reg.
35-15 (3) (a)(2); see Army Reg. 210-10, TI 5- 5 ( d). Spock
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military
base do not violate the First Amendment. 424 U. S., at 840;
i d., at 848 (POWELL, J. , concurring). ·
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members
of the military services to secure command approval before
circulating written materials within a military base is not
invalid on its face. Id. , at 840.11 Without the opportunity to
10

The Army regulations allowed a commander to delay, and the Deparlment of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a military base of
particular i~sues of a commercial publication. Anny Reg. 210--10, 5-5
(c), (d) (1970) . That part of the Army regulations wa~ not ai, i;;sue in
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,832, n. 2 (1976) . The Air Force regulations
contain no such proviRion.
11 Glines would distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in
that efL8f' were civilians who had no 8pf'cific l'ight to enter a. military base.
The distinction is unpersuasive . Our decision in Spock rf'jre1 ed a facial
challenge to n re>gulation that require>d "any person ," civilian or military,
lo obtain prior permiHHion for the distribution of literature within a base.
Id .. at 831. Unauthorized di:stributions of literature by military personnel a.re just as likely to undermme discipliu e a.nd morale ns similar dis~
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review materials before th0y are dispersed throughout his
base, a military commander could not avert possible disruptio11s among his troops. , ince a commander is charged with
maintaini11g morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have
authority over the distribution of materials that could affect
adversely these essential attributes of an effective military
force. 12 "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command
depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability
of [hisl subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned st)ecific and customary reliability of the superior." Deparbnent of the' Air Force
v. Rose, 425 F , ., at 368. Becaus<' the right to command
tributions b~· riv1hnn~. Fmthrrmorr, thr military lrns grrni<'r authori1y
owr n servicrrnnn than ov<'r a eivilinn. Sre Pa1'ker v. Levy, 417 U. S. 7:33,
749-751 (1974) . Ewn wlH•n not confronted with thr HJWeiaJ requirements
of thr militar~·. Wf' hnvr hrld that a govrrnmentnl <'mploy<'r may ~ubjrct
it,- rmployPrS to ,;urh ~reeinl mstrictiom: on free Pxpres~ion n~ are r<'aHonnuly nrcP~sar~· to promote pffrrt1v<' government. S<'C' Civil SPnnce Cumm'n
v. Letter C'an·frrs. 41:3 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); Cu/e v. Richardson, 405
U.S . 676, fi84 (Hl72) ; c-f. Kell<'!/ v. Johnson, 425 lT. S. 2:{8, 245-248 (197G).
12 The spre1,tl dangpr:,; prf'srnt in rertain militarr i::ituation,- may warrant
clilfrrrnt restnetion$ on the rights of :,;rrvicPmrn. But tho~e rr:;trictions
necr,-~ary for thr 111ru!cat10n and mamtemrnce of ba,-1c di,-ciplinr and preparrdness arr as ju:;tifif'd on a rrg11l:tr lntse in tllC' l111ited Stairs. Schne£cler
v. Laird, 45;1 F. 2d 345 (CAlO) (per c-uriarn), cert .. denird, 407 U.S. 914
(1972) ; Dash v. Comma1u7ing General. 307 F. Supp. 849 (SC 1969),
aff'd, 429 F . 2d 427 (CA4 1970) (per curiam), cNt. demed, 401 U. S. 9 1
(1971), as on a trainmg ba~P, Greer v. Spuck. supra, or a C'ombat-rendy
ins1allation m the Pacifir, Carlson v. Schlesing<'r, 167 U. S. App. D. C.
:325. 511 F. 2d 1:327 (1975) . J,o~·alty, morale, and discipli1w are e;:;sential
attribute;:; of all military :,;ervice. Combat service obv10usly rrquire,- them.
And membrr,- of thr armf'd i::nvices, wherever thf'~· arp as:,;1µ;11Pd, may be
tr:-rnsfrrred to combat dut~· or ra!led to drnl with civil d1,-;ord<'r or natur.il
d1sa:,;ter . SmeP tlw 11nor approvnl requirement :,;upport~ <'ommandrr:-;'
authorit)· to maintam bn:,;ic cli:,;e1pline rrquired at near!~· <'V<'r~· military
irn,tallation, it does not off!'11cl the First Am!'ndment. ''Tiu:,; Comt
hail ..• rrpPatecU~· t'xprps:,;<'d Its reluctance to strikl' down a :,;tat ute on its
faef' where thrre rare] n :-mbstantinl number of :,ituation" to which it
~rnght he validly applied." f!lrker v. Levy, Stt1)/'n, at 760.
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and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g.,
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander
to determine before distribution whether particular materials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops. 13
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical m purpose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock.
"\Ve therefore conclude that they do not violate the First
Amendment.

II
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U.

. C.

§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command

approval for the circulation within a military base of petitions
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "ln]o person
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We
find his contention unpersuasive.
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in response to a specific and limited problem. While Congress
13 Commanders sometimes may apply the><e regulation~ ''JrratiuuaJly, 111vidiou:,ly, or arbitrarily," thm; giving ri::;e to !Pgitimate claim:, under the
First Amendment. Gree,r Y. Spock, 424 U. S., at 840. But Glme::;, wholike the civilian:, in Spuck-never rrque,;ted permIB:,10n to eircnlate lus
matnial«, has not and cannot rai::;e ::;uch a rlaim. !bid.; id., at 849

(POWBLL1

J .,

COIJClll'l'ing)
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was debating the Act. Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin
learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship discharge
from the Navy "had been told by his commanding officer •.•
that a direct communication with his Congressman was
prohibited and ·[that] it would make him subject to courtmartial." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). When the Congressman made inquiry about the regulations imposing this
restriction. the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they
required "any letter from a member of the naval service ..•
to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment ..•
'[to] be sent through official channels." lbid. 14 The Congressman then proposed an amendment to the pending military legislation that would outlaw this requirement.
Congressman Byrnes' purpose w:as "to 1,ennit any man who
is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write
to his Congressman or Se11ator." lbid.rn The entire legislative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue
for the communication of individual grievances. The ChairH The relrv,111t. N:w? rrgulntion actually -irnposrd restrictions on "f a.]ll
petitions, rrrnonstrances. memorials nnd communications from nny 11erson
or pcr:,;on~ in the naval service . . .." Navy Rrgs .. art. 1:248 (1948)'.
Glines argues that Congrrss intruded to remove nll restrict1011s impo8rd by
the rrgulation, including thosr on collectivr as wrll ai, ind1vicbwl petitioning. But tlw plain lnnguagr of ~ 1034 refleets no snch intention. Indeed,
nothing in tlH' legislativr bi;;tory sugge;;ts that Congrc::;s even was aware
of thr foll ~copr of thr r-iav~· regulation.
15 The origirntl proposal pro1 ected any person from induc1ion into a
branch of the armed forcrs that rrstricted the "rights of 11 s members to
communicate direct]~, with J\,kmbrrH of Congrrs~ . ... " 97 Cong. Rec.·
3776 (1951) . After the Clwirman of the Armed Service~ Committee
pointed out t.ha l the Nnv~1 did not induct its mrmbrrs, ibid., tlrn proposal
was amended to substantial!~- i1~ present form, id., nt 3877, 3883. Universal Militar:v Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144,
§ 1 (cl), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent minor revisions when codified
in HJ56 . Act of Aug. 10, 195(-i, Pub. L. 102k, ch. 1041, 70A St111.. 80. No
change in substanee wa~ intended. See S. I~ep . No. 2484, 84th Goug., 2c1·
Bess., 95-9(-i, Hl-21 (195(-i) ; H. R Rep. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,.
85, 8-10 (1955).
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man of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was
Intended "to let every man in the armed services have the
privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any subject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with
some secret matter.'' Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that
Congress enacted § 1034 to ensure that an individual member of the armed services could write to his elected representatives without sending his communication through official
channels. 16
Both Congress and this Court have found that the special
character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with
matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g.,
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37-40, 43 (1976); id., at
49-51 (POWELL, J., coucurring); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 756 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. 8. 83, 93-94
(1953). 17 In construing a statute that touches on such 1natters,
therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended
by Congress." Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App.
D. C. 26, - , 575 F. 2d 907, 916 (1978) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, No. 78-599.
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to
submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves
the legislative purpose of § 1034 without unnecessarily endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good

1,.,,..

,.

,

'

10

Section 1034 1otands in ma.rked contrast to an analogou:-; ~tatute enacted about 40 year:; ea,rlier in order to guarantee frderal civil ::;ervants
the right t.o petition Congrrss. That statute provides : "The right of
employres, individually or collectively, to petition Congre::;;; or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congre:;:;, or
to a. committee or Member tlwreof, may not be interfered with or denied."
5 U . S. C. § 7211. (Empha~1~ added .)
17 See also Curry v. Secretary of the Anny, - - U. S App. D . C. - ,

~,95 F .. 2.d. 8?3 ( 1979)"
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order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legislative purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and
no indication that Congress contemplated such a result. 18 We
therefore decide that § 1034 does not protect the circulation of
collective petitions within a military base.

IV
We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10
U. S. C. § 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring members of the service to secure approval from the base commander before distributing petitions within a military base ..
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are
not invalid on their face. Accorqingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
,d

18 Glines says DOD Dir. 1325.6, ,rIII (G) shows that the Department
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, however, adds nothing to the statutory language or the legislative hi8tory.
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Milita.ry .Tustice, art. 138, 10
U. S. C. § 938, protects the "[r]ight of members [of the armed forces] to
complain and request redress of grievance:; against action;, of their commander." It then cites 10 U. S. C. § 10:H for the statement that "a
member may petition or present any grievance to any member of Congress . ... " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 26,
- , 575 F. 2d 907, 913 (1978), rev'd, No. 78-599, the court concluded
that this reference to § 1034 implied approval of group petitioning. But
the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demonstrate that the Department of Defense has construed its own directive·
otherwi:se. See s'upra, at 6-7 , and n. 9.
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
~
Since an affirmancc on statutory grounds in Nos. 78-599 and ~
78-1006 does not command a Court, it is appropriate to _4
express my view on the constitutional questions presented. I ~ ~
believe that the military regulations at issue are prohibited by a<-. ~~
the First Amendment; accordingly, I would hold them to be ~ - ~
unconstitutional, and affirm the judgments of the two Courts A.
lh
1
of Appeals.
- ~
Two sets of military regulations are challenged. Respond- ~ ~
ents in Huff (No. 78-599) attack Navy and Marine Corps ~
regula.tions that require prior approval by commanding officers
;
before the origination, distribution or circulation of petitions 1lu_ ~ S ~
or other written material on ships, aircraft, military installa~ ~
tions and "anywhere within a foreign country." FMFO k ,.,,,,~~~
5370.3. Respondent in Glines (No. 78-1006) challenges
· -r;
parallel Air Force regulations that require command approval l>f ~
before the distribution or posting of nonofficial printed mate- ~ .
£J~ - ~
rial and for the circulation of petitions for signature. 1 AFR
--.,- - 7
L_

"',a::6:-t=t.....

-1~- ~-

The Air Force regulations exempt from prior command approval the
distribution of published material "through the United States mail or
through official outlets, such as military libraries and exchanges." De1
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30-1 (9), 35-15 (3) (a). Both the Navy and Marine and the
J\ir Force regulations authorize withholding of approval if the
comrnancler determines that distribution "·oulcl pose a "clear
dang0r" to loyalty, discipline or morale of servicemen or if
the distribution would "materially interfere'' with military
cluties. 2 The Air Force regulation explicitly declares, however, that "[dlistribution or posting may not be prohibited
solely on the ground that the material is critical of Governnwnt policies or officials." (Rmphasis added.) ~

I
Res11ondents contend that the regulation1, impcrmissihl:v
interfrrp with First Amendm0nt rights to communicate ancl
r)('tition. That contention finds solid support in First AmenclnlC'nt doctrine ns explicated in a variety of s0ttings by decisions
of this C'onrt. These regulations plainly establish an 0ss0ntinlly discretionary rrgime of cenrnrshin that arbitrarily
cknrive"' re<:ponclenfo of precious cornmunica tive rights.
The circnlation of 11Ptitions is indisputably protected First
,\ rnenrlrncnt activity. Petitioning involvrs a bundle of related
First Amendment right-': the right to express idrns. SC<', e. g ..
S!rect Y. Nrw York, ::\04 P. S. ,576. 593 (1969); Martin v. City
of Struthers. 310 TT. 8. 141. 143 (1043). the rig·ht to be exposed
to irl0ns C'-:pressecl by othNs. F><'0. P. g., Stanley v. acorgin, 094
F. 8. fi57. 564 (1069) : Lamont Y. Postmaster GenPral. 3~1
F. A. 301 (1963); 1·r1 .. ut ~08 (BRENNAN. J., conr11rrin[-!;):
partrnrnt of Df'frn°r guirlrlinr~ arr 1o t hr s:,rnr rfTrrt. DOD Dirrrtivr
1~2.'Ui.
2 In addition, thP Knvy nnd l\f:irinr Corp:- rPg11lntions hnr rirr11lation
or m:itrrinl thnt advor:itrs inf;11hordinntion, disloy:i!tv, rnutinv, or clrsrrtion, thnt di~closrs rl:is,ifird information, th1t rontnins oh~rrnr mn1trr.
or 1h:if, involves thr planning or 11nlawr111 nr1R.
s A rmmterpnrt, to this clerhr1tion is thr sfntemrnt in DOD Directi,·r
1~'.?.'5.fi. that "rtJhr fort th:11 a p11hlir:1tion is critirnl or Governrnrnt
polirirs or offirinls is not, in it~rlf, n ground npon which distrib11tion rnnr
hr prohibited."

,,
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l\fartin v. City of Struthers, s1,7Jra. at 143, the right to coinmunicatc ,:vith government. ser, e. (!., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. R. 220, 23!'i (1963); rf. flaoue v. CJ(), 307 U . R.
496, 313 (1939) (Roberts. J.). and the right to associatr ,vith
others in the expression of opinion. i"C'C, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo,
424 TT. S. 1, 15 (1076); Healy v. James, 408 U. S. 169. JRl
( 1072) ; N AJ CP v .• 1lnbmna. 357 TT. 8. 449, 460 (19.18) .•
Thr petition is especia11:v suitrrl for the rxrrcise of all of these
riirhts: it serves as a vehicle of corn.munication; as a classic
means of individua1 affiliation with ideas or opinions: and as
a 1)('acdul yet effective nwthocl of n.inplifying the vic\\·s of the
inclividunl signers. Indeed. thr prtition is n trnrlitionally
ffff0r(>rl method of politicfll rxprrssion nnd participation. Rrr.
e. (!., United StatPs "· rruil:shank, 9~ TT. S. M2, !'i52-553
(187:'i); J. Rtory. C'omnwnbrirs on t],e Constitution of thr
rnitrcl Statf's 619- 620 (Cooley rd .. rnn); cf. TVh:tr "·
Nfrholls, 44 P. S. (3 IIo,Y.) 2R6, 280 (1845). Thns, prtitioning of officials has brrn f'"l)rPo:s]v hrld to hf' ,' l rir.i:ht r-::ecnrrd by
thr First .'\mendmrnt. 0 Rrfr!r,r-: Y. C'alifnrnia. 3 14 TT. R. 252,
277 (Hl41).
T'his First ~'\meNln 1 rnt i-hirld for prtitioninp: io: i111prr111ip,siblv hrc?chcd in nt lrnc:t thre0 wnvs lw thr rrgi1lntioni- bdorr
118.

First. By manclr:iing that prono"rrl prtitions hr ~uhif'rtrd
t0 commnnrl apDr0Y[11. tlw rrgnbtionc; irnnnr-::c fl prior rrPtrni11t."
• Tt may br thnt thr Prtition Clm1Pr, in Pornr rontrxtR. rnhnNC'H thr
pro1rrtions of the Sprrrh C'lau,r. Tl1rrr i~ no nrrd. howrYrr. to r,plorr
1hr di~tinctivr nttributrs of tl1r Prti1ion Cl:i1N' in thrPr raRC'', f0r conYrntionnl First, Amr11dmrnt :1nnlY~i,; nrnpl)· Puffirr~ to dispo,r of thr
ron~1 itutional i~;;nr,; prr~rntrd hrrr.
~ Brrau8r tlrn petition s0 rffrrtivrh· promotrs n numhrr of Fir~t Amrnrlrnrnt, interests--'('~J)('riall~· 1hoRr thn1 nrr n~sorin t ionnl in nn t11rr-prt i1ioning is not mrrely fungiblr \\'i1 h ot hrr rxprr~~ivr nrt iYit ir~.
6 The command approvnl requirrmrnt iR 1:!£1 sj ~ 1!~· n "timr, pl:IC'C' nnd
r n ~ vnlirl nndrr 1hr First Amrndmrnt. Ser Polirr Detnrtment of Chicago v. ,lfoslc.,1. 4Qq U. S. 92, fl~ (]!)72). Thr ron,-·1itut ionnl to11rhstonr of prrmi~~ihlr Iimc', plnrr, nnet m:mnrr rrg1iln1 ion is
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Sec Greer Y. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 865 (1976) (BRENNAN, J.,
dissenting) ; Smdheastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420
r. R. 1546. fi52-553 (1075); T imes Fil?n Corp. v. Chicago,
065 P. S. 43. 4.S-46 (H)61). Although the First Amendment, bar against prior restraints is not absol_~~ l\Tebraska
Press Assn. v. Shiart, 427 F. S. 539, 590 ()()76) 'f_l:3R ENNAN, .J ..
roncurring in judgment), the Court has repeatedly emphasized
that tlH' prior ccnc:;orc:;hip of ex;)rcssion cnn be justified only by
the moPt f'ornpr1ling goyrrnmental interests, i"ee. e. g., Nebraslrn Press Assn. v. Stirnrt, silpra , at .5n8- 5,59; New York
Y. fT11itC'd States , 408 1 . S. 7m. 714 (1971) (per
Tim es
ruriarn opinion); nrqan-iza11·on for a Better Austin v. Kerfe,
402 TT. 8. 415, 4 Hl (1971): Rantnrn Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U. R. .58, 70 (Hl63): !\Tear v. Minnesota , 283 lT. S. 607,
71 -5 -716 (1031 ). Thus far. onlv tl c intcrrst in avrrting a
Yirtuall:v rrrtain proc::pect of imminent. severe in.iurv to tlw
Nation in fonc of ,rnr lrns bC'rn genera1lv ronsicl r recl a s11fficir11tlv wei gh ty gron'mi fnr prior rei::traint of ron~titutionallv
protrf'ted spcech. 1 See. r. g., J\.Tew York Tim es. 81/J)ra, at 726--

ro.

0

t hnt it focu~ 1111011 t hr rir~mn~t:111rrs-not t hr co nt rnl of rxprr~,ion.
Id., at 99. The militnry rC'gulntiom: in this rn ,::p-focinlly nncl nR np11lird-look to the' contrnt of petition~, n~ wrll :1, to thr rn:1m1C'I' in
which thC'y nrC' circulntrd.
7
To br surr, wr hnve upheld rr~t rnints dirrrterl againRt olwcrnity,
Times Film Corp. "· Chicaao. supra, 36.5 U. R., nt 47--4/s, or again~t
so-rnllrd "fighting worclH," Chaplinsky v. Nrw llampshire, 815 U. S. 568
(19-~2). Such rC'strnintH have been prrmittecl on the theory 1hnt tlw censorC'd expresRion clors not rnjoy First Amendment protC'rtion. We lrnve
nlwnys been cnrefnl to insist, however, tha1 rest riction,:: nimecl n1 unpro1E'ctr<l speech br cnrdully crnfted nncl nppliC'd to avoid trC'l1ching upon
communicntion that comes within thr nmhit of thr First Amc11clment.
Sec, r. g., Freedman"· Maryland, supra.
IL has also been ,::peculated ihat, the direct, immeclinte threat of interference with tho trial procc~,:: mighi, warrnnt a re,-tr::iint upon con stitutionnll:,· protected ex11res ion. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, supra, nt
569-,570 (dictum). But scr id., ::it 588, 594-505 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment). Significnntly, howevrr, this Court has rcpcntrdly

'
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727 (BRENNAN, J.); id., at 730 (ST1~wAnT, J.). The instant
r0guhtions, however. explicitly rNprire commanding officers
to supprnss petitioning for reasons for less urg 0 nt than imminent, serio11s. peril to tlw Unitl'cl States or its citi7,ens. Th0
maintenance of military clisciplinP. morale, and cfficicnrv me
undeniably important, b11t they r1r0 not always, and in cvNy
situation. to be regarded as rnon' compelling 1l1an a hoRt of
other governmental interests " ·hich WC' lrn Yc found i11:_;:uffici0nt
to m1rrnnt censorship. Ree. e.g., Kew Ynrk Times v. Unded

Strrt<'s, su'nra: Tink<'r Y. DN; MninC's Sthnnl District. 393 F. S.
fi03 (Hl69) ; :.,0c nlso Buckley ,,_ T'al<'n, supra. Moreover,
tcrm-i as arnornhous [1S "di sci pl i nr" rn1 cl "morale" invite la titmlinnu s intrrprrtation t]1at intolcrnblv clisaclvantagr:, thr
0x0rcise nf First Amendment rights. Ser Procunir>r v. ]\,fartinez. 4Hi l~. S. 3%, 41?i-41G (1974). ; \ i:, these very casrs
illnstratr . the 1wrcPi ,·Pcl thr0R( to di i:-ripli110 and morale ,yiJ1
often corr01atr with thr rnrnrnanding officer's pC'rsonal or
polifr•al hiai""'i.~ Sec p. 12. infrrr.
8Pcor>d. Tlw rommand annrovnl proc·0clnrc implrrnrnt;11a;
thr"P rPg11lations is :00ri0uslv flr Y
;t" Ti7iw and 27ai11. 1h0
<'oJJrt, has unckr:;:cor~ t1w nrinriP°t7 that r rstrnin t s unon rornrr,irctcd efforts to wield thr jndirial rontcmpt powrr against rxprrs~ion
1J,at assrrtrdl:-· .i ropa rdizrr! 1hr ndmini,.;1 r,1tinn nf ,i11~t irr Srr La ndmark
Communirotioirn, /n (' . ,·. T'irginio, 435 U. 8. H20, ~-11-R-l!i (197R): W ood v.
Georgia, 370 U. S. 37-5 (l052): Craig Y. !Tam e?/. 331 U. S. 3fi7 (1947):
Pe11nekamp Y. Florida, 32, U. R. 331 (104G); Bridges v. California, s11pra,
314 U. S. 2.52.

'Among thr f: 11 pprr~-:rd ('omrn1111irn t ion., "'rrc• a JH'I i1 ion to a Congrr~-mnn
f-11pporting :1mnr"t)' for Yirtnmn 1Var rrsistcrs nnd a leaflet outlining
rrrt:1in rei,pondrnts' views about, thr constitutional rights of servirrmen.
Both WCI'(' ('(•n~orrd, the formrr brc:1t1~(' ii "conlainrPdl gro,;.~ misstn1rmrnts and implications of law and fort and impngn[rd] by inmwndo the
motives and roncluct. of the Cornmandrr-in-Chid of thr Armrd Forcrs":
thr lattrr bera u,.;c it was "by transparent. im11li rat ion, dis1wq1C'ctful and
<·onkrnptuo11~ of all of yom ,uprriors .... " App., nt 45-47, 50, No. 78-500.
Thr Government conceded brlow tlrnt Rupprrssion of the lranet w11R improper under military regulntions. Govt. Brirf, nt, 8, n. 3.
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munication must be hedgerl about by procedures that gum·antee against infringement of protrrtrrl rxpres:::ion ancl that
eliminate the play of discretion that epitomizes arbitrary
censorship. See, e. g., Southeastern Promolions, Ltd. Y. Conrad, supra., at 558-562; Blount v. Rizzi, 400 lT. S. 410, 416--417
(1971): Crirroll v. Commissioners of Princess Annr, 803 U. 8.
17fi. 181 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (l9fin):
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, su7)ra, at 70-71 (]968): cf.
SchnPider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). W0 have icl0ntificd
:::nerific f'afeguards that arc inclispensablc if a system of prior
apnroval is to avoid First Amendment pitfalls. These inC'ludr
(1) the requirement that the bmdcn of justifyinp; censorship
fa]l upon the censor. s0e ATew York Times Y. U11derl Stairs.
s11pra. nt, 714; Freedman v. Marylanil, s1i7Jra, at 58, (2) tlw
condition that administrative suppression mu"'t b0 subject to
s1 0erlv imlicial review, ~cc Blount,·. Rizz1·, S?1pra, n.t 417. :rnrl
tlw rnle that tho'SP who~(' Fin,t Anwmlnwnt interests arr
at -:tak<' be given notirc and an opportnnit_v to hr herml dminp;
:::upnre::::::ion proC'eedings, f<C'C' Carroll v. Cor111nissio11crs of
Princess Anne. suprn, at 181- !R~: rf. Procunfrr v. ]1,f art?'nc:z,
s1mrn. at 417-419.
Nnnc nf thef'0 s11feglH1rd1" ic:; present unclN thr prior rommand anprova1 sclwmc. Thrrr is no indiC'ntion that thr
burd 0 n of j 11 Rtifyin,i; censorship rests upon thr n.11thoritieP.
Nnt only do0s the commanding officer mnkr his own determination to su~)prrsR. but 110 pro2.-:i ~ is maclr fpr prompt .iudirial rrYiew. 0 And \\'(' srnrrh thrrcii;ulations in vmn for nnv
nrovis'i~ ::iffording the right to ap1;car bdore the cen::;orin~
offirer to ar~U<' for apprm·n1. Tlrns. the r0~nlnti0ns uttrrly

on

Tt, is unnPC'C'SRnr? to ronsidn whrt brr SC'n·irC'tnC'n mig:ht rhn liC'ng:C'
rrn~or~hip dC'risions by bringing: s11its ngnin~t. ihC'ir rommnnrling ofnrC'r~.
The lnr.k of provision for immC'rlinte ,i11rlirinl fC'YiC'w i~ noi rurrd by thC'
poP;a;hility thnt, nn indiviclunl mig:ht l1$P11ffiC' !hr hmdrn of rommrnring n
rollntrral nction. Cf. Blount v. Rizzi. supra, 400 U. S., nt 418. Morconr, it is unlikely ns a prnctirnl mnt!C'r ilrnt. prr~ons 8C'1Yinl); nt SC'fl or
on foreign soil will hnvC' rrnclr nrrrss to dcnnrstir frdC'rnl romts.
0

r
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fail to meet e\'cn the minimum procerlmal dictates of tliC'
First Amendment; ratlwr. as designed. they countc>nance the
arbitrary ancl nonnrutral supprrssion of communication by
l)etition. 10
Third. Tlw regnlations clrmonsi rnbly clo not serv!l_ the military interests offerecl as tlwir compelling juptification':""and for
that reas~ alone Yiol:JtP the First Arncnclnwnt. If regulation
of communir::ttiYe rightc:; is to hr .iuc:;tified by ::i comprlling
governmcnfal interest, the rrg11btion must precisel71 further
thnt interest; ,Yhrre constitutional rights arr at Rtakr. important ends do not sustain mismntrlwd nwans. Srr 1Yebraskn
Prfss Assn. "· Stuart, suprn, at M~- .167, 560; Prornnirr v.
Mortinez. supra, at 4m. Tn this rrRprct, the r<'gulations h>re
pbin1v founrlrr. The rnoi::t irnporhnt purpose that can he
l)('sitf'd for tlwm iR pr<'wntion of inritrrnent to military clisorr1<'r. But if the danri;rr of inritrmrnt necrssitat0s prior
r]r.'lrancr of s0rvic0mrn's mrssrig:rs. it would be logical for the
rnilitnrv to mandntc nr0rlrnrn nrf' of all messa9~<'s. whctlwr
rirc11laterl bv nrtition or dissrrninf'ltrrl orally. Sinre oral cfo,_
r·1,ssion ic:; not sub.irrted to preliminary crn:::orship. rlonbt 11111st
hr raisrd as to the 11rgenr" r111d thr f'ffirncy of r,:uch rrnsor:::hip
wlwn communication iR bv petition. In other words. inaf'm1lf'h as the rontrnt of an ornl rommunication mny b0 idrntica l to the content of a prtition. tlwrr iR no re::ir::on to single
out nrtitions for :i content pr0rlf'nrnnrr rrqnirf'mrnt.
The onlv mtional basis for rlif:nnrn1r treatment of pditionirnr anrl or.'.l] romrnuniration wm1ld hr the presenrr of son1 e
10
.i\gnin : the fuct11nl hnckgro1md of I hr~r rn. e,; is instrurlive. Two re~ponctents individunlh· ~nbmitlrd :1 Pinglr lr:1net for nppro\'nl. Thr rommnnding genernl denied 0ne re,pondrnt prrmission to di,-:trih11te thr
le,,nrt. on basr, becn1Pr of i1, cti,-:rr,J)('r1 f11l mid "ron1rmptuou~" 1one.
Thr snme officer prrmit1ed 1hr o1hrr rr~pondrnt to circulatr 1hr idrntirnl
lrnflrt outside the mnin p:atr. App. 80, 50. No. 78-500. Siner thr onpo~t / off-post distinrtion hnd not hrrn ron~idrred di~po~i(i\·r wi1h re~pect
to other request,;,, $PC App. 44, 4o-47. No. 7R-590, it iH difficult to ictrnlif)'
thr principle uncterlyinp: thr differing ctc,ci~ions nboul the lr:1Rel.
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clanger veculiar to lhe process of 7>etitioni11g. But petitioning
differs from simple verbal exprC'ssion Ollly in that it involver:a;
an element of physical conduct. Insofar as that physical
rlernent of the prtitioning process poses a greater threat of
di~rnption than docs simple verbal expression, recoursc to
content-neutral regulation of the time, p1acr, ancl mannrr of
circulation is surelv an appropri.atr and s11fficicnt altcrnatiYc
to suppr0ssion. Bv orclering- prior official review of the content of prtitions. thesC' regulations arc an cxcessivr r0sponse
to any distinctive problems of petitioning. Even tlw moc:t
impcrfant gov0rnnwnta1 purpose cannot ,iustifv a rrp-ulation
that unduly burd0ns First Anwnclmrnt, lib0rtirs. Rrc Shdtnn
V. 1'1tcker, 364 1T. 8. 479. 488-400 (] 960).

IT

All that the Court offers to palliate these fatal constitutional
infirmiti"'s is a series of platituclrs about the special naturr nncl
owrn·lwlming impo~ c~ of 1cilitary necPssity. 11 A11tC', at
f>-6.
Military ( or national) sc<'uritv is a wciq;htv intcrr:'1t, 11ot
lrast of all becavsr nationa.J survival is an indi:-:pcnsablc con11
The Court, ante. at n. 11 , al~n ~urrgrsts th:it rurlnilmrnl of' Firsi
Amrndmrnt frrrdoms mi<.rht hr wnrranled innsmurh a~ srrvirr prr~onnrl
a re govrrnmrnt cmplo)·rr~. riling Ci1>il &.;·1,ice C2 mm'n ,.. Lf ltl'r Ca:rriers,
41.'3 U. S. fi..J.'l (1973). Tq.ill, do; j ~i1r. Thr 11rrdicntr for
upholding liberty rrst rictions a~ a condition of 11ublic rmplo:vmrnt must,
at least in pnrt, be the Yoluntnrinr~s of thr deriRion to nrrrpl govrrnmrnt rmployrnent. At vnrious times, howPver, this rn11ntry has ind11ctrd
ritizens into military srn·ice as a mnttrr of compul~ion. Morrovrr, nnlikr
other employers, srrvirrmPn may nol frrrl~· rrRign 1hrir 11osts should lhr:v
drC'ide io unburc!Pn ihr m~r]vp~ of rrHtraints upon tlwir frrrdmn of
exprrssion.
It is also noteworthy that the sintutory sehrme considerrcl in Letter
C'arriers permitted employees to "1s]ign n politicnl prtition as an individual," Letter Carriers, supra, nt 577, n. 21, nnd eviclrnll~· further
allowed the full pnnoply of prtitioning rights with resprct to prtilions
addrrssrd to t hr Frdrral Gonrnmrnt, id., at 572-57 4, 587-588 (a11pr11dix).

9

dition of national libertieR.
['nilcd States v. Robel, 380
F S. 258. 264 ( 1967). But tlie concept of military neces~ity
is secluctivel:v broad, and has a dangerous plasticity. Because
they invariably have thr visng<' of overriding importance.
there is ahrnys a temptation to i 11 rnke security "n<'cessi ties"
to justify an rncroachmen t upon civil liberties. For that reason, the military security argument must he approached \\·ith
a healthy skepticiRn,: its vory gravity connsels that comts be
cautious ,Ylwn military nrcessity is invoked by tbe Govornnwnt to justify a trespass on Fir,;1 .\monclment rights.
Such skoptir·i,-m lay at the henrt of our decision in iY<'w
York Times v. United Stales , suprrr. Thore, the Govrrnment
urged that Jwhlication of tho Ro-en llod Pentagon Papers \\'Oulcl
damago tho Nation's security cl11ri11g n. period of armed con flirt.
We rejrctod that assertion. 4m TT. 8 .. at 714. 8Pparate
opinions srrutinized the security argument, and declined to
rrly merely llpon tho GovNnmrnt's rharacteri,mtion of the
interest at stako. 403 r. S. 7]!)-720 (Black J.); id .. at 722724 (Dou~laR. ,T.): id., at 726- 727 (Dm~NNAN, J.); id., at 730
(S-rBWATl'r, .J.); id .. at 731. 733 (WHTTE. J.).
Similarly,
United Slat('s Y. Robel, su'f)ra, at 26~-264, spurned sirnplo
deference to "taliPmanic incant::dio11fsl" of" 'war powrr.'"
Analogously, wo have stringently viowcd the national f'e>curity
::irgumont ,..-J1<,11 it h::ic;; brr>n proffered to suriport domestic
warrantloc:s smvcillancc. United 8/atrs v. Unded States Distrirt Court, 407 U. S. '.207. 320 ( 1072).
To he suro, gPnera]s and aclmirnls. not fcdcrnl judges, aro
expert aho11t military needs. Bllt it is eqnally trne that
.irniges, not military officrrs. possoss the competence and
anthority l0 interpret and apply tho First Amendment. Moroover, in tho context of this casr, the oxpcrtise of military
officials is. to a great degrco, tainted by the natural self-interest
that in,,vitalilv influences their exorciso of the power to control
exprrssion. Partiality mu Rt bo rxpoctrcl when government
authoritirs crnsor the Yie,Ys of snbordinatos. especially if those
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views are critical of the censors. Larger, but vaguely defined .
interests in discipline or military efficiency may all too easily
become identified with officials' personal or bureaucratic preferences. This Court abdicates its responsibility to safegiiarcl
free rxprcssion when it reflexively bows bdore the shibb_Qletl1
of military necessity. Cf. La-;:;-;J;wrlc Communications, Jnr.~'Yirg1:nia. 435 U.S. 829, 842-84r5 (1978).
A nronerly detached--rather than u2,1dul.z accruif§centnpproach to the military necessity argmnent here wonlrl
rlonbtlrss hove ]eel the C'ourt to a different result. The militarv's 0111.isl"ion to rrgnlat0 tllC' cont·ent of oral communication
s11ggrsts th0 pointlei'snri"s of controlling th0 identical messagr
v:lwn rmboclied in a nctition. It is further troub1ing that
thrsr rezulatio118 appl:v to all military bases. not merely to
those that operate unclcr combat or nenr-combrit conclitionR.
Tlw "front 1il1P" and the rear erhe1on mav be clifficnlt to
irlentlfy in tho conditions of modern warfare. bnt thrrc is fl
clifferrnre hetwcrn an encarnpJY\ent that faces imminPnt conflict :rnd a military installation th::it nrovid0s staging. s11pport.
or training services. It is simply impossible to credit the
ronkntion tlrnt national sr:-cnrit~.r is significantly promoted hv
the control of petitioning througho11t all installations.
Finally. and fundamentally. thr C'ourt has been cleludcd i11to
1111(JUCi:'tiOning; acccptancr of th~vrry 1la,vf'd a'-Sl;;nption that
cliscipli1w and morale ar0 enhanced by restricting peacrful
communiration of various -viewpoints. Properlv regulatrd as
to time. place. and manner. petitioning provides a useful 0t1tlrt
for airing complaints and opinions that are helcl as P.trongly
hv cit1z0ns in uniform as hy th0 rest of society. The forcrd
f!bSC'llf'f' of peaceful expression only creates the illusion of
g0od orrler; undf'rlying disE>rnsi on remains to flow in to thC'
rnorP dangnous channel:" of incitcmrnt and disobedience. In
tlwt Sf'DSC', military 0fficiC'ncy is only disserved when Firi"t
A menclmcnt rights are dcnilucd.

,-
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ITI
The C'ourt cF egiously errs in holding that Greer v. Spock,
424 U. S. 828 (1976), compels the validation of these reg11latio11s. I dissented in Greer, ancl continue to disagree with the
decision in that case. But, in any <'VC'nt. Greer is not clisposi- 1
tive here; incleed, if it governs at all in these cases. Greer is
a11thority that the rrgulations arr constitutionally indPfrnsible.
Greer arose bccanse of th<' r<'.i rction by military authoriti<'s
of Dr. Benjamin Spock's rrqu0st to hold a presidential Cflrnpaign meeting and distribute ram11aign literature at Fort Dix.
Although tllC' case involVC'd a nurnlwr of Army re11;111ations
rrstrictinr.; vnrious expre1-siv0 flrtivities-including regulations
par::1llel to those b 0 forp 11s 11ow--th0 actnr l issuC' in Greer \Y2S
thr rxclmiion of a politieallv parti1-nn campaign pffort. And
t 1,f'rr wer0 thrre critical rlcnH'nts in GrC'er that promptPd thr
C'onrt to snstain th; t exclusion : ...
.
First, the C'ourt rrlircl upon the proposition that civilians
ln.ek cxprcssiYC rights on militRrv reservation<: from wl1ich
thf'v can bf' r,cluclccl. Si1l'nificantlv. the previous clrcision in
Flower v. United States, 4-07 F. S. H)7 (1972) (per curinm).
,Yns distinguil"hecl on the ground thnt leaflettin~ in Flower had
t:ikcn place on a portion of Fort Rnrn TTonston tlrnt hnd lwrn
rffrrtivelv rlPdicntecl to public usr.
Second, the C'omt, notrd that srrvicernen stationrd at Fort
Dix had C'nsv uccesc;, to off-husr p11blir forn where tl1rv could be
exposed to ~omrnunfc:"ations by Dr. Sno~ and other~. Bv the
snrne token. although not discusRrrl in Greer, thesr off-bnic:r
forn provided Dr. Spock with nrnpl0 opportunity for exnrePsivc activity. Tims, from tlw stnmlpoint of speaker and listenrrs, the Fort Dix regu1ations only effrctecl a partial cutoff
of commm1icativc rights brcausr othrr eq11ival0nt awnucs of
interchange remained oprn.
Finally, Greer repcaterll:v rrnphasized the lack of any claim
that the Fort Dix rC'gnlntiom: had bern applied in bia,:ed
fashion. It explicitly not0d the con,plcte absence of any

.
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q11estion of "irrationa rlJ. in Yi cl imi [ s l, or arbitrar[ y l" app lica tion of the Arm_v rer:nlations. 424 U. S., at 840. Accordingly, the Court did not confront thr problem of official discrimination among political viC'wpoints. Indeed, Greer placed
, ·eight 11pon a perceived "Am.erican constitutional trnclition"
that the military bo institutionnll,v free of political entangl<'ment. and that it avoid "the appC'arance of acting as a hnnclmaiden for partisan politiral caus<'s or candidates." Id .. at

s::m.
These thrcr predicateo: to Greer are wholly absent in th<'
P-etting in whfrh we review the regulation ::; before us. ~
their facr, and as ap.J_)lied in these Ct:!S<'S, the regulations
r0sfncf the <'"Xprcssive activities of individuals who arC' manrla torily, not pPrmiF'sivrly, present on militarv reservatwi1S.
For soldiers and sailors, as oppo<Jrd to civilians, military]
in c:-t allations must be the pbce for "frer ... corn.munication
of tllomrhts," GrePr v. Spock, supra, at 8~8. Furthrr, whPn
sen·ic<' p<'rsonnel are stationed ahroad or at sea. the basp or
"·nrshin is wry likely the 011111 place for frep commurncation
of thrrn~hts. 12 Thus, in contrast to Greer, the rcgnlationR her0
p0rmit c0mpk•te foreclosurr of a distinctive mode of rxnression by :oervicc1nr'n, \Yho lark th<' civilipl 's outiop to clr-p::irt
th0 snhNe of military a11thorit:v.
These casPs also diffn from Grepr bPCflllPe they <'X<'rnplify
p0rvasive official partialitv in the regufotion of rncs.snircs. 13
Th<' order<; rcfnsing command approval for respondents' petitioning or lpafletting flowC'd from th0 obviously bias('(] official
.iurlcr,rncnt that the content w~s "erroneons and misleading
<'Ommcntnry,'' App., at 34. No. 78-.509, or that it "impugn Pell
bv innuPrnlo tlw motives and ronclnrt" of the PrPsident, Apn.,
at 46. Xo. 78-.509. Far from being evenhanclccl regulation,

1

r

12 The regulationR 1wrmit commnnding officers to restrain prtitioning
nrtivities off-bnsr in foreign countri e~.
1 ' 1 While the rcRpondrnts in the~r rn~<'" mOlrnt a facial c}rnll;'.!!,Sr to 1hr
militn.ry regulations, an appreciation of the thcorrticaTctanger~ 11o~ed by
the regulations iH brst gained hy con~ickring their operation in pract icr.

II )

"

, ....

78-lOOG & 7, - 590-DTRSENT

BROWN

11 •

m. .nES

1:3

this sort of command judgment is quintessentially political;
in suppressing communication thnt "impugns" Prer-idrntial
conduct "b:v innucnrlo.'' miliinr:v authorities entangle themselves in national politics. Riner thesr cas0s involve discriminatory rcg11lation of cornmunication, Greer's assum 11tio11 of
military nrutrality-and. consrqurntly, Greer's result- cannot govern here. Actually, thr "trndition of a politically nrt1tral mi litary." Greer, s117)ra, a! 8~0. strongly counsrls invalidation of thrsC' re,i:i: ulations. whirh drmonstrably encomage
commanding officrrs to rxf'rcisr perRona l political .iucl)'!rnrnt in
deciding whether to permit pctitioning;. 14
Today's decisions, then. clm:h, rathrr than comport. with
the underlyinv. premises of Creer v. Sp ock. The Court l!lll1<'Ccs:aarily trammels important First Am0ndment rights b:v
nncritica.Jl:v accepting thr clnhious propo-;ition that militnry
security rrquires- or is fnrthrrrd- by the discretio1rnry s1rnprrssion of a classic form of peaceful group rxpression. Servicemen and women de<srn-e brtter than this. I resncctfnlly
dis~0n t.

11 Indrrd, inn~much fl~ rr;rnl:l tion~ s1:itr thfl t dis1ribution or po~1ing or
pr!ition,-; or othrr writing~ '·mn~· not br Jlrohibi1rd solely on 1hr grmmd
tlrni thr rna1rrial if' rriticfll of C:o\·rrnmrnt polirirs or official,-," AFR
:35-1.5 (3) (a) ( cmphasi~ addrcl), 1Ii(• implication is that prohibition mn~· hr
par1ly hflFrd upon the> foci 1hn t 1hr rn:11 rrial in qnrRtion challrngr,: gO\·rrnment polic? or officials .
Furt hrr, nt len~t one cornm:111d rrRJJOnRr to fl prtit ioning rrque;:t indir:\ir;:
tlrnt thr officer in rlrnrgr ron,:ickrrd hi~ rrnRoring function to imlmlr 1hr
duty 1o "nfford proprr guidanrr to tlir men undN my commnnd," A11p., nt
4G-47, No. 78-599.
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves challenges to United States Air Force
regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on
Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations
violate the First Amendment. The second question is
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to
communicate with a Member of Congress.

I
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force personnel have the right to petition Members of Congress and other
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (!:}) (1971). The regulations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force
facility " and "any ·[Air Force] member ... in uniform or . ..
in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition
without first obtaining authorization from the appr?priate
/
1
commander. lbid. They also provide that "[n]o membe1/
Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) provides:
"Righi of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and
civ iliun employees have the right, in common with all other citizens, to /

,,.

1

,

'.
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written
material . . . within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander. . . ." Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)
(a) ( 1) ( 1970). The commander can deny permission only
if he determines that distribution of the material would result in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale
of members of the Air Force, or material interference w i t h /
the accomplishment of a military mission . . . ," Id., 3515 (3) (a) (2). 2
petition the President, the Congress or other public officials. However,
the solicitation or collection of signatures on a, petition within an Air
Fore<· l'Hc1lit~· or by a memb<'r when in uniform or when in a foreign
_,____
co...u_try i:; prohibited unless first authorized by the commander."
2 Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1970) provides:
" (1) No member of the Air Force will distribute or po:;t any printed
or written material other than publications of an official government
agrney or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation without permis::;ion of the commander or hi;, desig11f:'e. A copy of the matPl'ial with a proposed plan or method of distribution or posting will be
;,ubmitted when permi:;::;ion is requested. Distribution of publications and
other materials through the United State;; mail or through official outlets,
such ns military libraries and exchanges, may not be prohibited under this
rrgul:1 tion.
" (2) When prior approval for distribution or posting ir,; rrquir-ed, the
commander will determine if Lt clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or
morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with
the arcomplishment of a military mi::;sion, would result. If such a determina1 ion is made , d1::;tribution or posting will be prohibited and HQ
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances.
" (3) Mere possession of materials unauthorized for distribution or posting ma y not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes
or push; or attempt8 to distribute or post such material within the installation. Impounded mat erials will be returned to the owner when departing the in;;tallation unless determined to be evidence of tL crime.
" (4 ) Di;,tribution or posting may not bf prohibited ;;olely on the g r o u n ~
that the material is critical of Government policies or officials.
" ( 5) In general, im,tallation commanders ~hould encourage au<l promote
the availability to :;ervice per~onnel of books, periodicab, and other media
which present a wide range of viewpoints on public iH;;ues."

~~

$,-.~S,~~

..-.?--"'<;. >0-1 (,,,,) O,,)
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air :Force Reserves.
While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in California, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air
Force's grooming standards. 3 Aware that he needed command approval in order to solicit signatures within a base,
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. During a routine training flight through the An<lerson Air Force
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before military authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines'
commander promptly removed him from active duty, determined that he had failed to meet the professional standards
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby reserves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the
circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and
~
10 U. S. C. § 1034. 1 The court granted Glines' motion f o r /
summary judgment and declared the regulations facially invalid. 401 F . Supp. 127 (1975). 5
The petition to the Secretary of Deferne, for example, read:
"Dear Secretary of Defense:
"We, the undersigned, all American citizen" serving in the Armed Services of our nation, request your as~istance in changing the grooming standards of the United States Air Force.
"We feel that the present regulations on grooming have caused more
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for
authority than any other official Air li'orce policy.
«·we are 8imilarly petitioning Senator Cranston, Seuator Tunney, Senator
Jackson, and Congrc~sman Moss in the hopP- that one of om elected or
appointed ofliciab will hrlp correct this problem." Glines v. Wade, 586 F.
2d 675,677, n. l (CA91978) .
/
4 Gliue~ named a~ defenda11t<l three of his superior officer~, the Secretary
1
' of the Air Forcr, and the Secretary of Dcfrn~c.
5 The District Court also awarded Gliues bnckpay and ordered him
restored to active srrvice. 401 F . Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The
8

k'

.~'
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The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).° Following its decision in an earlier case involving collective petitions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034. 7 The statute
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's communication with Congress "unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of
the United States." The Air Force regulations against
unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the statutory standard, the court concluded, because the Government
had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam
were necessary to the national security. Id., at 679. Since
§ 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of Defense, the court next considered whether the regulations violated the First Amelldment. The court acknowledged that
:equirer~1e:1ts of n:ili~ary discipline could justify otherwise
.~
1mpenmss1ble restnct10ns on speech. It held, however, t h a t /
the Air Force regulations are ui1constitutionally overbroad
because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually

,,

Court of Appeal:; aff. rmrd thr rein8tatrment order, but it vacatrd the
backpay award on the grourid that all monrtary claims against the United
States for more than $10,000 are witbin the exclusive juri~diction of the
Court of Claims. 586 F . 2d, at 681-682 . Neither is~ue 1s before this
Court.
6
The Co11rt of Appeals held that Glines was not requirc•d to exhaust
his admini8trative remedie8 by Hreking relief from t11e Air Force Board
for t,l1c Correci ion of 'lVIilita·ry Records. The court found t h1i1 Gline8' claim
involved statntor~, and com,titutional matters over which the Board had
no jurisdiction . id., at 678. Smee the petitiO!lers expres8ly declined to
raise the exha118tion issue in this Court , Pet. for Cert. 6, n. 2, error iu the
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issue would not affect our jmisdiction.
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,330 (1976) .
7
The Court of Appeals' decision and the discussion of thi~ i8sue ap1/)ear
.
in its opimon in Allen v. Monger, 583 F . 2d 438, 440--442 (CA9 1978),
cert. pending sub norn. Brown v. Allen, No. 78-1005.

•,

..'

.
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all controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such restrictions, the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari,
(1978), and we now reverse.
- U.S. -

II
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JusncE
wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitution ... disables a military commander from acting to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command."
In that case. civilians who wished to distribute political literature on a military base challenged an Army regulation
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that
the Army regulation was an unconstitutioual prior restraint
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of material that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness
of his troops.
ee id., at 837-839. We therefore sustained
the Army regulation. Id., at 840~For the same reasons, we
now uphold the Air Force regulations.
These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, pro.
tect a substantial government interest unrelated to the s u p - /
pression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U. S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, "by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society.'' Parker
v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises.
Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing
their mission promptly and reliably, the military services ·
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life." SchleS'inger v. Councilma:n, 420
U. S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-868 (1976).
STEWART

W'

________
Id:_________
<{;

,_

/!.

~Hines -A.Jo. 7~-/oD6 L, -Frn to end of next to last sentence on p.5
..·..

,:Z. We specifically emphasized that the Army requlation at

------------

issue in 6reer · v:-Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), did "not authorize
the [base] authorities to prohibit the distribution of
.,.

,.

conventional campaiqn literature."

Thus,

our decision to sustain that requlation was distinct from our
concomitant decision to uphold another regulation that prevented

,,,
'

civilians from using a military base as a forum for the expression

't

of political views, id., at 838-39.

,-J.,

C • J.,

concurring),

-a-f

l848t9

A

See id., at 841

~-

(Burqer,

(Powell, J., concurring).

...

'•
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"'Speech that is protected iu the civil populatio11 111ay ..•
undermine the effectiveness of response to command.'"
Parker v. Levu, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest,
21 U. R. C. M. A. 5G4. 570. 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972).
Thus. while members of the military services are entitled to
the protections of the First Amenclment, "th0 cliffercnt character of the military community and the rnilitary mission requires a differeut application of those protections." Parker
v. Levy, supra, at 758. The rights of military men must yield
somewhat "'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty . . . . ' ,, Id., at 744. quoting
V. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 140 (H)53) (plurality opinion). Rpeech likely to- q
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefor0 can be excluded from a military base. Spock,
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id.,
at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reasonably 110cessary to protect the substantial governmental interest. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra. Both the
and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set fort!1
1
in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969):V..., IO
That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible,
consistent with good order and discipline and the national security." Id., ,r II. Thus, the regulations in both services
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)

Bvs

Armyv,{'

q

Afsl'c Em<'r,-011, Towarrl n, C('ncral 'Throry of 1hr First Amcllclment, 72
Yale L. J. 877, 9:35-936 (HJa6); Tnrell, Petitioning Activitie~ on Military
Bast's: The Fm,t Amendment Battle Rages Again, 28 Emory L. J. 3, 5 - 1 4 /
(1979) .
10 -'The Nav? regulation:; ndopt<'d pur ·unnt lo Depnrtmcnt of Defense
(DOD) Directive 1325.G (1960) arr at issue in Secretary of the Navy v,
Huff, No . 78-599, which we also decide toqay.

!'

J\

,,
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(a) (2); Army Reg. 210-10, TT 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir.
1325.6, TT III (A) ( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifically prevent commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air
Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) ( 4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 TT III (A)
(3). Under the regulatious, Air Force commanders have no
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post exchange newstands. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1); see
DOD Dir. 1325.6, TT III (A)(l)Y Nor may they interfere I 1
with the "L d] istribution of publications and other materials
through the United States mail. . . ." Air Force Reg. 35-15
(3) (a)(l). The Air Force regulations also require any commander who prevents the circulatiou of materials within his
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Force Reg.
35-15 (3) (a) (2); see Army Reg. 210-10, TT 5-5 (d). Spock
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military
base do not violate the First Amendment. 424 U. S., at 840;
id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members
~
of the military services to secure command approval before~
circulating written materials within a military .base is not
invalid on its face , Id., at 840.~ Without the opportunity to ,:iJ\

...a.-e The Army regulatiol1s allowed a commande,r to delay, and the Department of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a milita.ry base of
pnrticuhr issnes of a commercial p11blication. Arri).y Reg. 210-10, ir 5-5
' (c), (d) (1970). That part of the Anny regulations waH not at issue i 1 /
,. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 818,832, n . 2 (1976) . The¥-ir :ForC'e regulations
,
contain no such provision.
1n Glines would di,;tinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in
1
t,hat ca,;e were civilians who had uo specific: righ1 to entPr ti military base.
The distinction is unpersuasive. Our decision in Spock rejec1 ed a facial
challenge to a regulation that required "any person," civilian or military,
to obtain ririor permiH~ion for the distribution of Iiteratme within a base.
Id. , at 831. Unauthorized distributions of literature by military personnel are just as likely to undermine discipliue and morale a,, similar dis~

'·
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review materials before they are dispersed throughout his
base, a military conunander could not avert possible disrupti01is among his troops. Since a commander is charged with
rnaintaini11g morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have
authority over the distribution of materials that could affect
adversely these essential attributes of an effective militar~ , 'l~
force~ "fT]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command?
depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability
of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned st)ecific and customary reliability of the superior." Departrnent of the Air Force
Y. Rose, 425 P . ,.., at 368. Because the right to command
tributious by !'iv1lian~. Furthrrmorr, tlw military ha~ grra1(' r authority
ovrr n :srrv1rrman th:111 ov<' r :1 <'ivilinn . Src Parker v. Levy , 417 1T. S. 7:33,
749- 751 (197-l) . Evrn whrn not ronfrontrd with 1hr ,;pr rial rrquirrmrnts
of the militar~·, wr have held that a governmental rmplo)·<'r ma~· 811bject
it,- rmployc'e8 to ,;ueh s11eeial rr8triction8 on frer expre8~ion as are rra::;onal.Jly nect-i;~ar? to promote pffrrtive government. See Civil Setvice C'omm'n
v. Letter Carriers . 41 :3 U. S. 548, 565 (1!)73) ; Cole v. R ichardson, 405
tT. S. 676, 684 (HJ72) ; rf. KPlley v. Johnson , 425 U. S. 238, '.2-J.5- 248 (1976) .
( '?, ~'hr ,-perial dangN~ prrse11t in rertain militar)· "'tuationHmay warrant
diffrrrnt rr,;tri et10ni;: on thr right~ of Hcrvicemrn. Bu1 tho~r rrstrirtion:=:
nere~:=,ary for the m<'ulcat1011 and maintrnnnce.of ba,:1c dbciplinc iwd prcparrdne;:;s are u~ JUHtifird 011 a rrg11lar lxisr in 1:11e United Stail>s, Schnefrle1'
v. Laird, 45;~ F . 2rl 345 (CA!O) (per C'Uriam), cert .. denied , 407 U.S . 914
(1972) ; Dash v. Com111a11di11g Geueral, 307 F . Supp. 849 (SC HJ69),
aff'd, 429 F. 2d 427 (CM 1!)70) (per cwiam) , cert. demed, 401 U. S. 981
(1971), a:=, on a traimng ba;-;r, Greer , . Spock. supra. or a combat-ready
im,tallation in the Pac1fir, Carlson v. Schlesinr1er, 167 U. S. App. D. C.
825, 511 F . 2d 1:327 (1975) . Lo)·tdty, morale, and di;:;c1pl11w are C8seutial
attribut eH of all military Hervice. Combat 8ervicc obviously rrquire;; thrm.
And membr r;; of thr armrd "rrvicr;;, whrrever th ey are as,ng11Pd, may be
transfrrrpd to !'Omhat cl11t~· Of <·a]Jrd to dra] with civil cl1,-,or(!Pr Or
d1;;a8ter. Smre thr prior approval rrquiremcnt ,.:upport,.: <'Ommandrr~'
authorit~· to maintam ba~ir cli;;c1pline requirrcl a1 11ear!y Pv<'r.,· military
1m,tallat10n, it doe8 not offrnd the Fir;:;t Amendmrnt. "Tiu::; Comt
has . . repeatrdl~· rxprPs~rd it;.: rrl11ctanre to 1:>trikc· down a statute 011 its
fare where tlwre fare] ,t :-mb1:, tantial number of H1tuations to which it
~mght he validly applied " Parker v. Levy, supra, ,Lt 760.

naturav
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and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this
Court long ago. recognized that the military must possess
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g.,
Schlesinger v. Counc'ilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander
to determine before distribution whether particular materials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops>/ I if
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in purpose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock.
We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First
Amendment.

'

0.

II
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. S. C.
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command

approval for the circulation within a military base of p e t i t i o n /
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "l_n]o person
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We
find his contention unpersuasive.
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in response to a specific and limited problem. While CongTess

,..

,"

It-t' ;Ml"'Commanders sometimes

may apply the8e regulations '·irrationally, invidiom,ly, or arbitrarily," thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the
First Amendment. Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S., at 840 But Gline,;, wholike the civilian8 in Spock-never requested permis,;ion to circulate his
, _ _m
_ atena 8, ms not an cannot
. id., at 849
(POWELL, J,, COllClll'fing) .

~r-e-~

~

v-
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.SCA~;
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was debating the Act, Congressn1ai1 Byrnes of Wisconsin
learned that a young constitue11t seeking a hardship discharge
· from the Navy '.'had been told ·by his commanding officer ..•
that. a . direc t ·cb1ni11unication . with his Congressman was
.· prohibited and. {that] . it would . make him subject to courtinartilil:':' 97 Cpng: ·Rec. 3.776 (1951}. When the Congress. tf1a1r , inad~ . i~1quiry about the regulations imposing this
·... · _: t.~str:iet,ion, · the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they
r.~:qµir~.d.·\i,ai~y ·i~tter·from a member of the naval service , , •
· · - · <: :J<;\,a· Coi1gressu!an \\'.hich· ~~ects ·the Naval Es~atyshrnent ..•
· :f.to] be· sent through official channels." Ibid.
The Congressman then proposed an amendment to the pending military legislation that would outlaw this requirement.
/
. ~ongressman. Byrnes' purpose was "t~, permit any man
1s m:~ucted to sit clown and take a pen~1l a;.1d paper ~lld wr~te
to his Congressman or Senator." Ibid>" T4e entire leg1slative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue
for the communication of ind,ividual grievances. The Chair-

.'· < .· ..·. '·_, .- .
· ··

11

w:10

?;

lb ,.a.+""l'lw relevnnt Navy regulation actually im110;1C'd restrictions on ''ra]II
pet.itionf', remonstrances, memorials and cmmmmicntions from any person
or per~orn, in the naval SC'rvice . . . ." Navy Regs .. a.rt.. 1248 (1948).
Gline::; argues ihat Congress intrnded to remove all ret:itrictions imposC'd by
the regulation, including thosr on collective as well as individual petitioning . But the plain lnnguage of § 1034 reflrds no such intention. Indeed,
nothing in the legi::;lativr history suggests t.hat Congre::;s even was aware
of thr full scopr of the Nav)· regulation .
lb .;1,5 The original proposal protC'cted any per::i0l1 from induction into
bra.nch of the armed forces that rC'stricted the " rights of it,- mC'mbers to
communicate direct!)' with Member,; of Congres,; . . .. " 97 Cong. Rec .·
3776 (1951) . After the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee
pointed out. that t.he Navr did not induct its members, ibid., the proposa ·
waR amended to subst.antin ll)' its present. form, icl., at 3877, 3883. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144,
§ 1 (d), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent. minor revision,; when codified
in 1956 . Act of Aug. 10. 1956, Pnb. L. 102Es, ch. 1041, 70A St,,t. 80. No
change in substame was inteuded. See S. R,ep . No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2cl
Sess., 95-96, 19-21 (1956) ; H . R . Rep . No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,.
85, 8-10 (1955),

·v

,,
,.

..·'
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man of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was
intended "to let every man in the armed services have the
privilege o'f writing his Congressman or Senator on any subject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with
some secret matter." Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that
Coi1gress enacted § 1034 to ensure that an individual mem·ber of the armed services could write to his elected represen. tatives without sending his communication through official 1
1
channels~
Both Congress and this Court have fom1d that the special
character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with
matters that affect internal discipline a11d morale. See, e. g.,
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37-40, 43 (1976); id., at
49-51 (PowELL, J. , concurring); Parker "· Levy, 417 U. S. 6
733, 756 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-9~ ( /
(1953)~ In construing a statute that touches on such matters~
therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended
by Congress." Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App.
D. C. ·26, - , 57.5 F. 2d 907-, 916 (1978) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenti1ig in part), rev'd, No. 78-599.
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to
submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves
the legislative purpose of § 1034 without unnecessarily endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good

11 --Section

1034 stands in marked contra:;t to an analogou~ ~tatute enacted about, 40 yearn earlier in order to guarantee frderal civil i,ervants
the right to petition Congrrss. That statute provides : "The right of
employees, incl-ividually or collectively, to petition Congre~~ or a Member of Congfess, or to furnish information to either House of Congres:;, or
to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered wit,h or denied."
5 U. S. C. § 7211. (Empha:,ii, added.)
( 'o _.See also Curry v. Sec;.retary of the Anny, - U. S. App. D ." C. - 1

~95 F. id 8?3 ( 1979).

.
'
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order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legislativ~ p~rp~se that requires _the military to assume this r~ and
no md1cat10n that Congre,ss contemplated such a result.
We /°I
therefore decide _that § 1034.does not protect the circulation of
. colJ~ctive p~titions withiri a military base.
.. ~...

'

.

··W~-co1-iclude .. that ·neither

U. S. C.

.

'

IV
the First Amendment nor 10

§ 1034 'preve~ts the Air Force from requiring mem-

bers of the service to -secure approval from the base c o m /
mander before distributing petitions within a military base ..
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are
not invalid on their face. Accorqingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is

,,
.:1. :

'·

.

'

/'f ~Glines

say:; DOD Dir. 1325.6, UII (G) shows that the Department
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, however, add:; nothing to the statutory language or the legislative history.
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10
U. S. C. § 938, protects the "[r]ight of members [of the armed force:;] to
complain and request redretJs of grievances again:;t, actions of their commander." It then cites 10 U. S. C. § 1034 for the statement that "a
member may petition or pre8ent any grievance to any member of Congress .... " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy , 188 U. S. App. D . C. 26,
- , 575 F. 2d 907, 913 (1978), rev'd, No . 78-599, the court concluded
that this reference to § 1034 imvlied approval of group petitioning. But
the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demonstrate that the Department of Defense has construed its own directiveotherwise. See s·upra, at 6-7 , and n. 9.
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Albert Edward Glines.
·
[January - , 1980]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
rrhis case involves challenges to Uniwd States Air Force
regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petition:S on
Air Force bases. The first question is whether the regulations
violate the First Amendment. The second question is
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to
communicate with a Member of Congress.
J[

The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force personnel have the right to petition Metnbers of Congress and other
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) . The regulations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force
facility" and "any [Air Force] member . .. in uniform or . ••
in a foreign country" from ·soliciting signatures on a petition
without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate
commander. lbid.1 They also provide that "[n]o member
1

Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9 ) (1971) provides:
"Right of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependents and
civilian employee::, have the right, in common with all other citizens, to
1

.....

~-

•'
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written
material ... within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander. . . ." Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)
(a) ( 1) ( 1970). The commander can deny permission only
if he determines that distribution of the material would result in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with
the accomplishment of a military mission . . . ." Id., 3515 (3) (a) (2). 2
petition the President, the Congress or other public officials. However,
the solicitation or collection of signatures on a petition within an Air
Force facility or by a member ·when in uniform or when in a foreign
country is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." This
regnlation has been super:seded by Air Force Reg. 30-1 (19) (b) (1977),
which contains substantially the same provisions.
2 Air Force Reg. 35...;15 (3) (a) (1970) provides:
" (1) No member of tl1e Air Force will distribute or post any printed
or written material other than publications of an official government
agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander or his designee. A copy of the material with a proposed plan or method of distribution or posting will be
submitted when permission is requested. Distribution of publications and
other materials through t11e · United States mail or through official outlets,
such a,; military libraries and exchanges, may ·not be prohibited under this
regulation .
" (2) When prior approval for di::;tribution or posting is required, the
commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or
morale of members of the Armed "Forces , or material interference with
the accomplishment of a military mission, would result. If such a determination is made, distribution or posting will be prohibited and HQ
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances.
" (3) Mere possession of materials unauthorized for distribution or posting mny not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes
or post:, or attempts to distribute or post such material within the installation. Impounded materials will be retumed to the owner when departing the installation unless determined to be evidence of a crime.
" (4) Distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the grouµd
·t hat the material is critical of Government policies or officials.
" (5) In general, installation comn1auders tihould encourage and promote

I

.
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves,
While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in California, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air
Force's grooming standards. 8 Aware that he needed command approval in order to solicit signatures within a base,
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. During a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before military authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines 1
commander promptly removed him from active duty, determined that he had failed to meet the professional standards
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby reserves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approv11l for the
circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and
10 U. S. C. § 1034.4 The court granted Glines' motion for
the availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media
which present a wide range of viewpoints on public issues."
8 The petition to the Secretary of Defense, for example, read:
"Dear Secretary of Defense:
"We, the undersigned, all American citizens serving in the Armed Services of our nation, request your assistance in changing the grooming standards of the United States Air Force.
"We feel that the pre::1ent regulations on grooming have caused more
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for
authority than any other official Air Force policy.
"We are similarly petitioning Senator Cran:;ton, Senator Tunney, Senator
Jackson, and Congre,;sman Moss in the hope that one of our elected or
appointed officials will help correct this problem." Glines v. Wade, 586 F .
2d 675,677, n. 1 (CA9 1978).
4 Glines named a::1 defendants three of his superior officer::,, the Secretary
,of the Air Force, and the Secretary of Defense.

•.,
"

.,'
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summary judgment and declared the regulations facially in•
valid. 401 .F. Supp. 127 (1975). 6
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).° Following its decision in an earlier case involving collective petitions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034. 7 The statute
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's communication with Congress "unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of
the United States." The Air Force regulations against
unauthorized petitioning on any ·base did not satisfy the statutory standard, the court concluded, because the Government
had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam
were necessary t? the national security. Jd., at 679. Since
§ 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the ·secretary of Defense, the court pext considered whether the regulations violated the First Amendment. ·The court acknowledged that
requirements of military discipline could justify otherwise
impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that

~· ,·
'

,

.•

The District Court also awarded Glines backpay and ordered him
restored to active service. 401 F. Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The
Court of Appeals aff.rmed the rein8tatement order, but it vacated the
· backpay award on the ground that all monetary claims against the United
States for more than $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims. 586 F . 2d, at 681-682. Neither issue is before this
' Court.
6 The Court of Appeals held that, Glines was not required to exhaust
his admini8trative remedies by seeking relief from the Air Force Board
for the Correction of Military"Tiecords. The court found that Glines' claim
involved statutory and constitutional matters over which the Board had
no jurisdiction. Id. , at 678. Smee the petitioners expressly declined to
raise the exhaustion issue in this Court, Pet. for Cert. 6, 11. 2, error in the
' Court of Appeals' resolution of the issue would not affect our jurisdiction.
' Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,330 (1976) .
7 The Court of Appeals' decision and the discussion of this issue appear
in its opinion in Allen v. Mongei·, 583 .F. 2d 438, 440-442 (CA9 1978),.
cert: pending sub nom. Brown v. Allen, No. 78-1005.
5

).;.
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the Air Force regulations are unconstitutionally overbroad
because they might allow commanders to suppress "virtually
all controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such restrictions, the court concluded, "exceed anything essential to
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari,
(1978), and we now reverse.
- U.S. -

II
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JusTICE
STEWART wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitu,.
tion ... disables a military commander from acting to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command."
In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political literature on a military base cha1lenged an Army regulation
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that
the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of material that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness
of his troops. See id., at '837-839. We therefore sustained
the Army regulation. Id., at 840. 8 For the same reasons, we
now uphold the Air Force regulations.
These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, protect a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U. S. 396, 413 (1974). The military is, "by necessity, a
We specifically emphasized that the Army regulation at issue in Gree!'
v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828 (1976), did "not authorize the [base] authorities
.to prohibit the di::itribution of conventional campaign literature." Id., at
840, 831, n . 2. Thu,-, om decision to HUHtain that reg-ulation Wai< distinct
from our concomitant decision to uphold another regulation that, prevented
civilians from using a military base as a forum for the expres:sion of
political views, id., at 838-839. See id., at 841 (BuRuER, C. J., concurring) ; id., UL c 48-849 (POWELL, J., COllC'Urring)'.
8

.·
I.
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specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker
v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises.
Ibid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing
their mission promptly and reliably, the military serviceg
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U. S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-368 (l976).
" 'Speech that is protected in the civil population may ...
undermine the effectiveness of response to command.'''
Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting· United States v. Priest,
21 U. S. C. M. A. 564, 570, 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972).
Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment, "the different character of the military community and the military mission requires a different application of those protections." Parker
v. Levy, supra, at 758. "The rights of military men must yield
somewhat "'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty. . . .'" Id., at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346
U. S. 137, 140 (1953) ( plurality opinion) .0 Speech likely to
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock,
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring) ; id.,
at 848 (PowELL, J., concurring).
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Army
and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set forth
in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969) .10
9

See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
Yale L. J. 877, 935-936 (1936); Terrell, Petitioning Activities on Military
Bases: The First Amendment Battle Rages Again, 28 Emory L. J. 3, 5-14
(1979).
10
The Navy regulations adopted pursuant to Department of Defense-

.;-
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That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible,
consistent with good order and discipline and the national security." ld., ,r II. Thus, the regulations in both services
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)
(a) (2); Army Reg. 210-10, ~ 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir.
1325.6, ,r III (A) ( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifically prevent commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air
Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) ( 4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 ,r III (A)
(3). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post exchange newstands. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(l); see
DOD Dir. 1325.6. ~- III (A)(l). 11 Nor may they interfere
with the " [ d] istribution of publications and other materials
through the United States mail. ... " Air Force Reg. 35-15
(3) (a)(l). The Air Force regulations also require any commander who prevents the circulation of materials within his
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Foree Reg.
35-15 (3)(a)(2); see Army Reg. 210-10, ,r 5-5 (d). Spock
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military
base do not violate the First Amendment. 424 U.S., at 840;
id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members
of the military services I to secure command approval before

..

t····

(DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969) are at issue in Secretary of the Navy v.
Huff, No. 78-599, which we also decide today.
11
The Army regulations allowed a commander to delay, and the Department of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a military base of
particular issues of a commercial publication. Army Reg. 210--10, ,r 5-S
(c), (d) (1970). That part of the Army regulations was not at issue in
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,832, n. 2 (1976.) .. The Air Force regulations;
'Q(l)ntain no such provision.

•.
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circulating written materials within a military base is not
invalid on its face. Id., at 840. 12 Without the opportunity to
review materials before they are dispersed throughout his
base, a military commander could not avert possible disrup~
tions among his troops. Since a commander is charged with
maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have
authority over the distribution of materials that could affect
adversely these essential attributes of an effective military
force. 13 "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command
u Glines would distinguish Spock on the ground that the plaintiffs in
that case were civifoms who · had no specific right to enter a military base.
The distinction is unpersuasive. Our deci~ion in Spock rejected a facial
challenge to a regulation that required "any person ," civilian or military,
to obtniu prior permi:;sion for the distribution of literature within a base.
Id., at 831. Unauthorized distribution,; of li1erature by military personnel are just as like1y to undermine discipline and morale as similar distributions Ly civilians. Furthermore, the military has greater authority
over a serviceman than over a civilian. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733,
749~751 (1974) . Even when not, confront,ed with the special requirements
of the military, we have held tha1 a governmental employer may subject
its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reasonably nece;,sary to promote effective government. See Civil Service Comm'n
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 (1973); Cole v. Richardson, 405
U.S. 676,684 (1972); cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-248 (1976).
13 The special dangers present in certain military situations may warrant
different restrictions on the rights of servicemen. But those restrictions
necessary for the inculcation and maintenance of basic discipline and preparedness are as justified on a regular base in the United States, Schneider
v. Laird, 453 F. 2d 345 (CAlO) (per curiam), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 914
(1972); Dash v. Commanding Geneml, 307 F. Supp. 849 (SC 1969),
aff'd, 429 F . 2d 427 (CA4 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981
(1971), as on a training base, Greer v. Spock, supra, or a combat-ready
installation ill the Pacific, Carlson v. Schlesinger, 167 U. S. App. D. C.
325, 511 F . 2d 1327 (1975) . Loyalty, morale, and di8cipline are essential
attributrs of all military service. Combat service obviously requires them.
And members of the armed services, wherever they are assigned, may be
transferred to combat duty or called to deal with civil disorder or na.tural
disaster. Since the prior approval requirement supports commander::;'
~uthority to maintain basic discipline required at nearly every military

'-
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depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability
of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and customary reliability of the superior." Department of the Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U. S., at 368. Because the right to command
and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g.,
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander
to determine before distribution whether particular materials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops. 14
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in purpose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock.
We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First
Amendment.

II
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. S. C.
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command
approval for the circulation within a military base of petitions
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "[n]o person
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicatinstallation, il does not offend the First Amendment. "This Court
has ... repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its
face where there [are] a :substantial number of i:iituations to which it
might be validly applied." Parker v. Levy, supra, at 760.
11 Commanders sometimes may apply these regulations "irrationally, invidiom,ly, or arbitrarily," thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the
Fir~t Amendment. Gre1.>r v. Spock, 424 U.S ., at 840; see Secretary of the·\
Navy v. Huff, No. 78-599, at 5, n. 5. But Glines, who-like the civilians
in Spock-never requested permission to circulate his materials, has not.
and cannot raise such a claim. Greer v. Spock, supra, at 840; id., at 8491
(PowELL, J.. , concurring).
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ing with a member of Congress, unless the communication is
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We
find his contention unpersuasive.
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in response to a specific and limited problem. While Congress
was debating the Act, Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin
learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship discharge
from the Navy "had been told by his commanding officer ...
that a direct communication with his Congressman was
prohibited and [that] it would make him subject to courtmartial.2' 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951). When the Congressman made inquiry about the regulations imposing this
restriction, the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they
required "any letter from a member of the naval service .. .
to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment .. .
[tol be sent through official channels." Ibid.'" The Congressman then proposed an amendment to the pending military legislation that would outlaw this requirement.
Congressman Byrnesi purpose was "to permit any man who
is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write
to his Congressman or Senator." Ibid.rn The entire legis1
" The rrl<'vani Nav)' regulation nctually impos1'd restrictions on "fa]ll
petitions, remonstrances, memorials and communications from any person
or persons in the naval service. . . ." Nnvy Regs., art. 1248 (1948).
Glines argues that Congress intended to remove all restriction~ imposed by
the regulation, including those on collectivr as well as individual petitioning. But the plain language of § 1034 rpflects no such intention. Indeed,
nothing m the Jegii,;lativc history suggests that Congre,;s even was aware
of the full scope of the Navy regulation.
16 The original proposal protect Pd any pert,on from induct ion into a
branch of the armed forces that restricted the "rights of its members to
communicate directly with Member;; of Congress. . . ." 97 Cong. Rec.
3776 (1951). After the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee,
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lative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue
for the communication of individual grievances. The Chairman of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, ·was
intended "to let every man in the armed services have the,
privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any subject if it does not violate the 1aw or if it does not deal with
some secret matter." Id., at 3877. It therefore is clear that
Congress enacted § 1034 to ensure that au individual member of the armed services could write to his elected representatives without sending his communication through official
channels. 17
Both Congress and this Court have found that the special
character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with
matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g.,
Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. 25, 37-40, 43 (1976); id., at
49-51 (PowELL, J., concurring); Parker v. Levy, 417 U. S.
733, 756 (1974); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94
(1953). 18 In construing a statute that touches on such matters,
pointed out that the Navy did not induct its members, ibid., the proposal
was amended to substantially its present form, id., at 3877, 3883. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144,
§ 1 (d), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent minor revisions when codified
in 1956. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. 1028, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 80. No
change in substance was intended. See S. Rep. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., 95-96, 19-21 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
85, 8-10 (1955) .
17 Section 1034 stands in marked contrast to au analogou,; ·tatute enacted about 40 yearl:! earlier m order to guarantee federal civil servants
the right to petition Congress. That statute provides: "The right of
employees, individually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or
to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied."
5 U. S. C. § 7211. (Empha:sii, added .)
18
See also Curry v Secretary of the Army, U .. S. App. D . C. -~
595 F • .2d 873 ( 1979) •
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therefore, ,courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended
by Congress." Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App.
D. C. 26, - , 575 F. 2d· 907, 916 (1978) (Tamm, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, No. 78-599.
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to
submit a petition directly to any Member of Congress serves
the legislative purpose of § 1034 without unnecessarily endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good
order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legislative purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and
no indication that Congress contemplated such a result. 10 We
therefore decide that § 1034 does not protect the circulation of
collective petitions within a military base.

IV
We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10
U. S. C. § 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring members of the service to secure approval from the base commander before distributing petitions within a military base.
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are
19 Gli1ws says DOD Dir. 1325.6, 1III (G) shows that the Department
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, how•
ever, adds nothing to the statutory language or the legislative history,
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10
U. S. C. § 938, protects the . "[r]ight of members [of the armed forces] to
complain and request redress of grievances against actions of their commander." It then cites 10 U. S. C. § 1034 for the statement that "a
member may petition or prese11t any grievance to any member of Congress .... " In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy , 188 U. S. App. D. C. 26,
- , 575 F . 2d 907, 913 (1978) , rev'd, No. 78-599, the court, concluded
that this reference to § 1034 implied approval of group petitioning. But
the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demon•
strate that the Department of Defense has construed its own directive
otherwise, See supra, at 6-7, and 11. 9.
I;
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not invalid on their face.
Court of Appeals is

13

Accordingly, the judgment of the

Reversed.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves challenges ·to United States Air Force
regulations that require members of the service to obtain approval from their commanders before circulating petitions on
Air Force bases. ·The first question is·whether the regulations
violate the First Amendment. The second question iis
whether prohibiting the unauthorized circulation of petitions
to Members of Congress violates 10 U. S.. C. § 1034, which
proscribes unwarranted restrictions on a servicemari's iright to
communicate with a Member ofrCongress.

I
The Air Force regulations recognize that Air Force personnel have the right to petition Members of Congress and other
public officials. Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971). The regulations, however, prohibit "any person within an Air Force
facility" and "any '[Air Force] member ... in uniform or . ..
in a foreign country" from soliciting signatures on a petition
without first obtaining authorization from the appropriate
commander. lbid. 1 They also provide that "[n]o member
Air Force Reg. 30-1 (9) (1971) provides:
"Right of Petition. Members of the Air Force, their dependent.s and
civilian employees have the right, in common with all other citizens, to,
1
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of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed or written
material . . , within any Air Force installation without per~
mission of the commander. . . ." Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)
(a) ( 1) ( 1970). The commander can deny permission only
if he determines that distribution of the material would result in "a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale
of members of the Air Force, or material interference with
the accomplishment of a military mission .••." Id., 3515 (3) (a) (2). 2
petition the President, the Congress or other public officials. However,
the solicitation or collection of signatures on a petition within an Air
Force facility or by a member when in uniform or when in a foreign
country is prohibited unless first authorized by the commander." T,his
regulation hall been superseded by Air Force Reg. 30-1 (19) (b) (1977),
which contains substantially the same provisions.
2 Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3) (a) (1970) provides:
"(1) No member of the Air Force will distribute or post any printed
or written material other than publications of an official government
agency or base regulated activity within any Air Force installation without permission of the commander or his designee. A copy of the material with a proposed plan or method of distribution or posting will be
submitted when permission is requested. Distribution of publications and
other materials through the United States mail or through official outlets,
such as military libraries and exchanges, may not be prohibited under this
regulation.
"(2) When prior approval for distribution or posting is required, the
commander will determine if a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or
morale of members of the Armed Forces, or material interference with
the accomplishment of a military mission, would result. If such a deter-mination is made, distribution or posting will be prohibited and HQ
USAF (SAFOI) will be notified of the circumstances.
"(3) Mere possession of ma.terials unauthorized for distribution or posting may not be prohibited unless otherwise unlawful. However, such
material may be impounded if a member of the Armed Forces distributes
or posts or attempts to distribute or post such material within the installation. Impounded materials will be returned to the owner when departing the installation unless determined to be evidence of a crime.
" (4) Distribution or posting may not be prohibited solely on the ground
that the material is critical of Government policies or officials.
'' (5) ln ge11eral, installation commanders should encourage and promot&
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Albert Glines was a captain in the Air Force Reserves.
While on active duty at the Travis Air Force Base in California, he drafted petitions to several Members of Congress
and to the Secretary of Defense complaining about the Air
F-orce's grooming standards. 3 Aware that he needed com- ·
mand approval in order to solicit signatures within a base,
Glines at first circulated the petitions outside his base. During a routine training flight through the Anderson Air Force
Base in Guam, however, Glines gave the petitions to an Air
Force sergeant without seeking approval from the base commander. The sergeant gathered eight signatures before military authorities halted the unauthorized distribution. Glines'
commander promptly removed hi,:n from active duty, determined that he had failed to meet the professional standards
expected of an officer, and reassigned him to the standby reserves. Glines then brought suit in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that
the Air Force regulations requiring prior approval for the
circulation of petitions violated the First Amendment and
10 U. S. C. § 1034.4 The court granted Glines' motion for
the availability to service personnel of books, periodicals, and other media
which present a wide range of viewpoints on public issues."
8 The petition to the Secretary of Defense, for example, read:
"Dear Secretary of Defense:
"We, the undersigned, all American citizens serving in the Armed Services of our nation, request your assistance in changing the grooming stand.,,
ards of the United States Air Force.
"We feel that the present regulations on grooming have caused more
racial tension, decrease in morale and retention, and loss of respect for
authority than any other official Air Force policy.
"We are similarly petitioning Senator Cranston, Senator Tunney, Senato~
Jackson, and Congressman Moss in the hope that one of our elected OI"
appointed officials will help correct this problem." ,Glines v. Wade, 586 F ,.
2d 675, 677, n. 1 (CA9 1978).
4 Glines named as defendants three of his superior officer8, the Secretaryof the Aii: J)'oi:ce, a{lcl the Secretary .of Defense.
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summary judgment and declared the regulations facially invalid. 401 F. Supp. 127 (1975) .5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
finding of facial invalidity. 586 F. 2d 675 (1978).° Following its decision in an earlier case involving collective petitions to Members of Congress, the court first determined that
the regulations violated 10 U. S. C. § 1034.7 The statute
prohibits any person from restricting a serviceman's communication with Congress "unless the communication is unlawful or violates a regulation necessary to the security of
the United States." The Air Force regulations against
unauthorized petitioning on any base did not satisfy the statutory standard, the court concluded, because the Government
had not shown that such restraints on servicemen in Guam
were necessary to the national security. Id., at 679. , Since
§ 1034 did not cover Glines' petition to the Secretary of Defense, the court next considered whether the regulations violated the First Amendment. The court acknowledged that
requirements of military discipline could justify otherwise
impermissible restrictions on speech. It held, however, that
The District Court also awarded Glines backpay and ordered him
restored to active service. 401 F . Supp. 127, 132 (ND Cal. 1975) . The
Court of Appeals affirmed the reinstatement order, but it vacated the
backpay award on the ground that all monetary claims against the United
States for more than $10,000 are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims. 586 F. 2d, at 681-682. Neither isi:;ue is before thi~
Court.
6 The Court of Appeals held that Glines was not required to exhaust
his administrative remedie::; by seeking relief from the Air Force Board
for the Correction of Military Records. The court found that Glines' claim
involved statutory and constitutional matters over which the Board had
no jurisdiction. Id., at 678. Smee the petitioners expressly declined to
raise the exhaustion issue in this Court, Pet. for Cert. 6, n 2, error in the
Court of Appeals' resolution of the issue would not affect our jurisdiction.
Cf. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 330 (1976).
7• The Court of Appeals' decision and the discussion of tliii:; issue appear-·
in its OlJinion in Allen v. Monge1·, 583 F . 2d 438, 440-442 (CA9 1978) ...
'cert. pending sub nom. Brown v. Allen, o. 78-1005.
5
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the Air Force regulations are unconstitutionally overbroad
because th~.Y might aJl9w commanders to suppress "virtually
1tll controversial written material." Id., at 681. Such reliltriction~, the court concluded; "exceed anything essential to
the government's interests." Ibid. We granted certiorari, ·
- U, S. - (1978), and we now reverse.

II
In Greer v. Spock, 424 U. S. 828, 840 (1976), MR. JUSTICE
wrote for the Court that "nothing in the Constitution ... disables a military commander from acting to avert
what he perceives to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his command."
In that case, civilians who wished to distribute political literature on a military base challenged an Army regulation
substantially identical to the Air Force regulations now at
issue. See id., at 831, and n. 2. The civilians claimed that
the Army regulation was an unconstitutional prior restraint
on speech, invalid on its face. We disagreed. We recognized
that a base commander may prevent the circulation of material that he determines to be a clear threat to the readiness
of his troops. See id., at 837-839. We therefore sustained
the Army regulation. Id., at 840. 8 For the same reasons, we
now uphold the Air Foree regulations. 0

STEWART

We specifically emphasized that the Army regulation at issue in Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), did "not authorize the [base] authorities
to prohibit the distribution of conventional campaign literature." Id., at
840, 831, n. 2. Thus, our decision to sustain that regulation was distinct
from our concomitant decision to uphold another regulation that prevented
civilians from using a military base as a forum for the expression of
political views, id., at 838-839. See id., at 841 (BURGER, C. J., concurring); id., at 848-849 (PowELL, ,T., concurring).
0
Mn. JusncFJ SnwEN's dissenting opinion seems to suggest that we
should avoid the constitutional issue in this case by applying 10 U. S. C.
§ 1034 to petitioning activity that the statute otherwise would not protect. Post, at - . Since Oline::;' petition to the Secretary of Defense
was not covered by the statute, however, we agree with the Court 01
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These regulations, like the Army regulation in Spock, protect a substantial government interest unrel3:ted to the suppression of free expression. 'See Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U, S. 396, 413 (1974). The military "is, ('by necessity, a
specialized society separate from civilian society." Parker
v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733, 743 (1974). Military personnel must
be ready to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises.
Tbid. To ensure that they always are capable of performing
their mission promptly and reliably, the military services
"must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life." Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420
U. S. 738, 757 (1975); see Department of the Air Force v.
Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 367-368 (1976).
" 'Speech that is protected in the civil population may .
undermine the effectiveness of response to command.' "
Parker v. Levy, supra, at 759, quoting United States v. Priest,
21 U. S. C. M. A. 564, 570, 45 C. M. R. 338, 344 (1972).
Thus, while members of the military services are entitled to
the protections of the First Amendment, "the different character of the military community and the military mission requires a different application of those protections." Parker
v. Levy, supra, at 758. The rights of military men must yield
somewhat " 'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty. . . .'" Id., at 744, quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346
U. S. 137, 140 (1953) (plurality opinion). 10 Speech likely to
interfere with these vital prerequisites for military effectiveness therefore can be excluded from a military base. Spock,
Appeals that "[tJhis petition requires us to decide whether the :F irst
Amendment, also protects Clines' activities." 586 F. 2d 675, 679. As the
Court, of Appeals nnderstood, Glines' petition to the Secretary was it~elf
a .:sufficient reason for his rea,;:signment to the standby reserves.
10 See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
Yale L. J . 877, 935-936 (1936); Terrell, Petitioning Activities on Military
Ba;;es : The First Amendment Battle Rages Again, 28 Emory L. J. 3, 5-14
(1979).
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J., concurring); id.,
J ., concurring).
Like the Army regulation that we upheld in Spock, the
Air Force regulations restrict speech no more than is reason.
ably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest. See Procunier v. Martinez, supra. Both the Army
and the Air Force regulations implement the policy set forth
in Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969). 11
That directive advises commanders to preserve servicemen's
"right to expression ... to the maximum extent possible,
consistent with good order and discipline and the national se.curity.'' ld., iT II. Thus, the regulations in both services
prevent commanders from interfering with the circulation of
any materials other than those posing a clear danger to military loyalty, discipline, or morale. Air Foree Reg. 35-15 (3)
(a) (2); Army Reg. 210-10 1 TT 5-5 (c) (1970); see DOD Dir.
1325.6, TT III (A) ( 1). Indeed, the Air Force regulations specifically prevent commanders from halting the distribution of materials that merely criticize the government or its policies. Air
Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)( 4); see DOD Dir. 1325.6 TT III (A)
(3). Under the regulations, Air Force commanders have no
authority whatever to prohibit the distribution of magazines
and newspapers through regular outlets such as the post exchange newstands. Air Force Reg. 35-15 (3)(a)(l); see
DOD Dir. 1325.6, iT III (A) (l). 12 Nor may they interfere
with the "[d]istribution of publications and other materials
through the United States mail . . . ." Air Force Reg. 35-15
supra, at 840; id., at 841 (BURGER, C.

a.t 848

(POWELL,

11 The Navy regulations adopted pursuant to Department of Defense
(DOD) Directive 1325.6 (1969) are at issue in Secretary of the Navy v.
Huff, No. 78-599, which we also decide today.
12 The Army regulations allowed a commander to delay, and the Department of the Army to prevent, the distribution within a military base of
particular is;;ues of a commercial publication. Army Reg. 21{}-10, ,r 5-5
(c), (d) (1970). That part of the Army regulations was not at i,;sue in
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 832, n. 2 (1976). The Air Force regulations
, contain no ·11ch provi:-ion.
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(3) (a) (1) The Air Force regulations also require any com'mander who prevents the circulation of materials within his
base to notify his superiors of that decision. Air Foree Reg.
35-15 (3) (a) (2); see Army Reg. 210-10, ,r 5-5 (d). Spock
held that such limited restrictions on speech within a military
base clo not violate the First Amendment. 424 U. S., at 840;
id., at 848 (POWELL, J., concurring).
Spock also established that a regulation requiring members
of the military services to secure command approval before
circulating written materials within a -military base is not
invalid on its face. Id., at 840.' 3 Without the opportunity to
review materials before they are dispersed throughout his
base, a military commander could not avert possible disruptions among his troops. Since a commander is charged with
maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have
authority over the distribution or -materials that could affect
adversely these essential attributes of an effective military
iorce:14 "[T]he accuracy and effect of a superior's command
13 Glines would distingui:sl1 Spocl-.: on !hr ground that the plaintiffs in
that case were civilians who had· no -specific right to enter a military base.
The distmction is unpersuasive. Our decision in Spock rejected a facial
challenge to a regulation that re4uired "any person," civilian or military,
to obtain prior permission for the distnbution of literature within a base.
Id., at 831. Unauthorized distributions of literature by military personnel are just as likely to undermine discipline and morale as similar dis,tributions by civilians. Furthermore, the military has greater authority
over a serviceman than over a civilian. See Parke,· v. Levy, 417 U. S. 733,
749-751 (1974) . Even when not confronted with the special requirements
of the military, we have held that a governmental employer may subject
its employees to such special restrictions on free expression as are reasona.bly necessary to promote effective government. See Civil Service Comm'n
v. Letter Carriers, 413 U. S. 548, 565 ( 1973); Cole v. Richardson, 405
U. S. 676,684 (1972) ; cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245-248 (1976).
H The spe<'ial dangers pre,-Pnt in certain military situa1ions ma.y warraJ1t
different restrictions on the rights of servicemen. But those restrictions
necessary for the inculcation and maintenance of basic discipline and preparedness are as justified on a regular base in the United States, Schneider
,. v. 'Laird, 453 F . 2d 345 (CAlO) (per cuiiam) , cert.. denied, 407 lT. S. 914

'·
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depends critically upon the specific and customary reliability
of [his] subordinates, just as the instinctive obedience of subordinates depends upon the unquestioned specific and customary reliability of the superior." Department of the Air Force
v. Rose, 425 U. S., at 368. Because the right to command
and the duty to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this
Court long ago recognized that the military must possess
substantial discretion over its internal discipline. See, e. g.,
Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U. S. 738 (1975); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U. S. 733 (1974); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U. S. 137
(1953); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83 (1953); In re
Grimley, 137 U.S. 147 (1890). In Spock, we found no facial
constitutional infirmity in regulations that allow a commander
to determine before distribution whether particular materials pose a clear danger to the good order of his troops. 15
The Air Force regulations at issue here are identical in purpose and effect to the regulation that we upheld in Spock.
(1972); Dash v. Commanding General, 307 F. Supp. 849 (SC 1969),
aff'd, 429 F . 2d 427 (CA4 1970) (per curiam), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 981
(1971), as on a training base, Greer v. Spock, supra, or a combat-ready
installation m the Pacific, Carlsan v. Schlesinger, 167 U. S. App. D. C.
325, 511 F . 2d 1327 (1975). Loyalty, morale, and discipline are essential
attributes of all military service. Combat service obviously requires them.
And members of the armed services, wherever they are assigned, may be
transferred to combat duty or called to deal with civil disorder or natural
disaster. Since the prior approval requirement supports commanders'
authority to maintain basic discipline required at nearly every military
installation, it does not offend the First Amendment. "This Court
has ... repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its
face where there [are] a substantial number of situations to which it
might be validly applied ." Parker v. Levy, supra, at 760.
1 6 Commanders sometime,; may apply the::;e regulations "irrationally, invidiously, or arbitrarily," thus giving rise to legitimate claims under the
Firtit Amendment. Greer v. Spock. 424 U. S., at 840; see Secretary of the
Navy v Huff, No. 78-599, at 5, u. 5. But. Glines, who-like the civilians
in $pock-never requested permission to circulate his materials, has not
and cannot Tai~e such a claim. Greer " · Spock, supra, at 840; id., at 84~
(PowELI,, J , concurring).

'i
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We therefore conclude that they do not violate the First
Amendment.

II
The only novel question in this case is whether 10 U. S. C.
§ 1034 bars military regulations that require prior command"
approval for the circulatiou within a military base of petitions
to Members of Congress. The statute says that "[n]o person
may restrict any member of the armed forces in communicating with a member of Congress, unless the communication is
unlawful or violates a regulation necessary for the security of
the United States." (Emphasis added.) Glines contends
that this law protects the circulation of his collective petitions
as well as the forwarding of individual communications. We
find his contention unpersuasive.
Section 1034 was introduced as a floor amendment to the
Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in response to a specific arid limited problem. While Congress·
was debating the Act, Congressman Byrnes of Wisconsin
learned that a young constituent seeking a hardship dischargefrom the Navy ·"had been told by his commanding officer .••
that a direct communication with his Congressman was·
prohibited and '[that] it would make him subject to courtmartial." 97 Cong. Rec. 3776 (1951) . When the Congressman made inquiry about the regulations imposing this
restriction, the Secretary of the Navy informed him that they
required "any letter from a member of the naval service .• _
to a Congressman which affects the Naval Establishment .• .,
'[to] be sent through official channels." lbid.10 The Con'i<J The relevan1, Navy rrgula!ion actually imposed restrictions on "[a.]11
petitions, remonstrances, memorials and communications from any personor persons in the naval service.. .." Navy Regs., art. 1248 (1948) •.
Glines argues that Congress intended to remove all restrictions imposed by
the regulation , including tho8e on collective as well as individual petitioning. But the plain language of § 1034 reflects no such intention. Indeed,
nothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress even was aware-of the foll scope of the Navy regulation.

,.
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gressman then proposed an amendment to the pending mili.
tary legislation that would outlaw this requirement.
Congressman Byrnes' purpose was "to permit any man who
is inducted to sit down and take a pencil and paper and write
to his Congressman or Senator." lbid. 11 The entire legislative history of the measure focuses on providing an avenue
for the communication of individual grievances. The Chairman of the Armed Services Committee succinctly summarized
the legislative understanding. The amendment, he said, was
intended "to let every man in the armed services have the,
privilege of writing his Congressman or Senator on any subject if it does not violate the law or if it does not deal with
some secret matter." Id., at 3877.. It therefore is clear that
Congress enacted § 1034 to ensure that an individual member of the armed services eould write to his elected representatives without sending his communication through official
channels.18
Both Congress and this Court have found that the special
The original proposal prot,ected any person from induction int.o a
branch of the armed forces that restricted the "rights of its members to
communicate directly with Members of Congress.. . ." 97 Cong. Rec,
3776 (1951) . After the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee
pointed out that the Navy did not induct its members, ibid., the proposal
was amended to ·substantially its present form, id., at 3877, 3883. Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, Pub. L. 51, ch. 144,
§ 1 (d), 65 Stat. 78. The statute underwent minor revisions when codified
in 1956. Act of Aug. 10, 1956, Pub. L. 1028, ch. 1041, 70A Stat. 80. No
change in substance was intended. See S. Rep. No. 2484, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., 95--96, 19-21 (1956); H. R. Rep. No. 970, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.,
85, 8-10 (1955).
38 Section 1034 stands in marked contrast to an analogous statute enacted about 40 years earlier in order to guarantee federal civil servants
the right to petition Congress. That statute provides: "The right of
employees, individ'Ually or collectively, to petition Congress or a Member of Congress, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or
to a committee or Member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied .'tQ (J, 8. C. ~ 7211, (Emphasi::i added ,)
17

...
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character of the military requires civilian authorities to accord military commanders some flexibility in dealing with
matters that affect internal discipline and morale. See, e. g.,
M iddendorf v. Henry, 425 U. S. ·25, 37-40, 43 (1976) ; id., at
49-51 (POWELL, J ., concurring), Parker V • . Levy, 417 u. s.
733, 756 (1974) ; Orloff v. 'Willoughby, 345 U. S. 83, 93-94
(1953).u In construing a statute that touches on such matters,
therefore, courts must be careful not to "circumscribe the authority of military commanders to an extent never intended
by Congress." Huff v~Secretary
the Navy, -188 U.S. App.
D. C. 26, - , 575 F. 2d 907, 9f6 (1978) (Tamm, ·J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'il, No. 78-599.
Permitting an individual member of the armed services to
submit a petition directly to any' Member of Congress serves
the legislative purpose of § f034 without unnecessarily endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good
order among his troops. The unrestricted circulation of collective petitions could imperil discipline. We find no legislative purpose that requires the military to assume this risk and
no indication that Congress contemplated such a result. 20 We
therefore decide that § 1034 does not protect the circulation of
collective petitions within a military base.

of

19 See also Cui·ry v. Secretary of the Army, U. S. App. D . C. - ,
595 F . 2d 873 (1979) .
20 Glines says DOD Dir. 1325.6, ,rIII (G) shows that the ·Department
of Defense itself construes the statute more broadly. The directive, however, adds nothing to the statutory language or the legislative history.
It simply says that the Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 138, 10
U. S. C. § 938, protects the "[r]ight of members [of the armed forces] to
complain and request redress of grievances against actions of their commander." It then cites 10 ·u. S. ·c. § 1034 for the statement that "a
member may petition or present any grievance to any member of Congress . .. ." In Huff v. Secretary of the Navy, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 26,
- , 575 F . 2d ·007, '913 (1978) , rev'd, ·No. -78-599, the court concluded
· t hat this reference to § 1034 implied approval of group petitioning. But
· the regulations enforced in the Air Force and the other services demonstrate t hat the Department of Defense has construed its own directive
,. otherwise . . ee supra, at 6-7, and n. 9.
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IV
We conclude that neither the First Amendment nor 10
U. S. C. § 1034 prevents the Air Force from requiring members of the service to secure approval from the base commander before distributing petitions within a military base.
We therefore hold that the regulations at issue in this case are
not invalid on their face. Accordingly, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
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No. 78-1006. Argued November 6, 1979-Decided January 21, 1980
Air Force regulations require members of that service to obtain approval
from their commanders before circulating petitions oil Air Force bases.
R espondent Air Force Reserve officer was removed from active duty
for distributing on an Air Force base petitions to Members of Congress
and the Secretary of Defense, which complained about Air Force grooming standards, without having obtained -approval of the base commander
as required by the regulations. Respondent then brought suit in District Court challenging the validity of the regulations. That court
granted summary judgment for respondent, declaring the regulations
facially invalid, and the Court of Appeals affirfued.
_
Held: The regulations are not invalid on their face. 'Pp. 5-13.
(a) Such regula.tions do not violate the. First AII).endment.
Greer ·v.
1
Spock, 424 U. S. 828. They protect a substantial Government interest
unrelated to the suppression of freo ·expression-the interest in main~
· taining the respect for duty and discipline so vital to military effectiveness-and restrict speech no more than is reasonably necessary to
protect such interest. Since a military commander is cha,rged with
maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have authority
over the distribution of materials that could affect a.dversely these
essential attributes of an effective military fdrce. Pp. 5-9.
(b) Nor do the regulations violate 10 U. S. C. § 1034, which pro~
scribes unwarranted restrictions on a serviceman's right to communicato
with a Member of Congress. As § 1034's legislative history makes clear,
1
Congress enacted the statute to ensure that an individual member of
the Armed Services could write to his elected representatives without
sending his communication through official channels, and not to protect
'the circulation of collective petitions within a military base. Permitting
an individual serviceman to submit a petition directly to any Member
'of Congress serves § 1034's legislative purpose without unnecessarily
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endangering a commander's ability to preserve morale and good order
among his troops. Pp. 9-12.
586 F. 2d 675, reversed.
PowELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J.,
WHrrE, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a
dissenting opinion. S'l'EWART, J., filed a dissenting opiniou, in which
BRENNAN, J., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. MARSHALL,
J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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